EPSILON MAGAZINE. NOVEMBER ISSUE 2005. P.77 CONTINUED FROM P. 8
COMMENTARY
Constraints on Iran's Use of the Bomb
A nuclear Iran has to take into account certain important constraints. One is
American deterrence. The Iranians have no doubt about the balance of power
between themselves and the Americans. And if they had any doubts, the American
conduct of the war in Iraq left no doubt about American capabilities. The
Iranians must also take into account that if Iran uses a nuclear bomb against
any of the allies of the United States, especially against Israel, the U.S.
will regard this as an attack against itself, and will react accordingly.
Another constraint involves Iran's reasons for seeking a nuclear bomb. One
reason is deterrence. The Iranians started their nuclear program back in the
late 1980s because Iraq was intending to acquire the bomb. Iraq was perceived
as the most important threat to Iran and the Iranians wanted an answer to this
threat. In Iran's view, the Iraqi threat was replaced in the 1990s by the
American threat. Israel is seen as a limited threat, but the Americans are
projecting the most important threat from the Iranian viewpoint and the
Iranians want an answer to this threat. Moreover, the Iranians regard their
nuclear capability as a very important symbol for acquiring hegemony in the
Middle East, especially in the Gulf area. If I'm correct that the Iranians
want a bomb mostly for deterrence and not so much for offensive intentions,
Iran is not likely to waste this weapon, once it acquires it, against a
country like Israel that does not pose a real threat to its existence.
Consequences of a
Nuclear Iran
However, even if Iran is not going to use the bomb against anybody including
Israel, there are still very negative implications from its acquisition of the
bomb. First, if Iran acquires the bomb, it will encourage other countries in the
Middle East to join this nuclear arms race, especially Egypt, and perhaps Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Algeria, and Syria. It would be difficult for a country like
Egypt, the leader of the Arab world, to stay out of this circle. Secondly, an
Iran with the bomb is going to be a more aggressive country. This could be seen,
for example, in encouragement of Hizballah to initiate new attacks against
Israel.
It could be in the field of oil prices. With the safety net of a nuclear capability, Iran might behave differently and more aggressively. Finally, Iran with the bomb is going to be the cornerstone of the radical camp in the Muslim world and in the Middle East as well. More moderate countries like Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states will have to accommodate themselves more than in the past to this new situation in which a central radical country will have the bomb. Despite the trends of the last two years, which were negative ones for the reformists, change in Iran will continue because there is a genuine demand for a change.
The younger generation in Iran, which now is
the majority of the population, demands more personal freedom, more political
freedom, less corruption, a better life, and a better economy. If this is the
will of most of the Iranian people, it's going to be very difficult for the
radical regime to contain this change. At the end of all this I expect a
dialogue between Iran and the United States, and a dialogue between Iran and
Israel. And if this is to be the case, even if Iran has the bomb by that time,
the bomb will have a different meaning.
Dr.
Ephraim Kam has served as Deputy Head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies at Tel Aviv University since 1995. He previously served as a
colonel in the Research Division of IDF Military Intelligence. He
specializes in security problems of the Middle East, Iranian strategy,
Israeli national security issues, and strategic intelligence. His
publications include: Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (1988);
The Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Implications on the
Middle East (1991, Hebrew); The Political Framework of the Palestinian
Entity (1993, Hebrew); and From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance
of the Iranian Threat (2004, Hebrew). This Jerusalem Issue Brief is based
on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs in Jerusalem
on July 26, 2005. Data: Jerusalem Issue Brief