Is There A Diplomatic Solution  To The Iranian Nuclear Issue?

Ephraim Asculai
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies

Last week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected Europe's most recent offer to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for various incentives, this time including a light-water reactor.  "Your incentives," he said, "are definitely not more valuable than nuclear technology.  How dare you tell our people to give up its gold in return for chocolate?" Ahmadinejad's response is but the latest in a series of rebuffs suffered by various parties searching for a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear issue.  A diplomatic solution to this problem is surely preferable to any alternative outcome and is the declared priority of most of those involved, including the United States, the European Union, and Russia.  But the chances of achieving one are virtually non-existent unless there is a radical change in the way the international community approaches Iran. Stripped down to the bare essentials, the problem is that Iran is conducting a program aimed at producing nuclear weapons.  Notwithstanding Iran's vehement denials, that conclusion is sustained by both the IAEA findings and Iran's own actions.  Had Iran wanted to prove otherwise, it would have acted differently, negotiating with the world in good faith, suspending indefinitely its nuclear activities, admitting all past misdeeds and offering complete and unhindered openness to the IAEA inspectors.  However, this is not the case.  Instead, Iranian tactics have been to toy with the international community and buy time in order to promote its ultimate aim.

Iran could fully resolve the problem by stopping and then dismantling all activities that are related, in any way, to nuclear weapons development programs.  Those include any uranium enrichment program, the construction of a heavy-water reactor, and any plutonium-related research and development activities.  But anything less than good faith action by Iran, subject to effective verification, would constitute only a partial solution and would probably be counter-productive; as the two temporary suspension agreements have shown, such "solutions" only buy Iran precious development time.  In order to assess the possibility of achieving a complete solution through negotiations, Iran's motivations must first be analyzed. Prior to the change of presidents in Iran in early 2005, four motivations for developing nuclear weapons could be assessed: Iran's threat perceptions; its aspiration to status and regional hegemony; strengthening the regime domestically; and the regime's hatred of Israel.  Ahmadinejad's election to the presidency and his rhetoric since then have brought the latter two considerations to the fore.  But Iranian nuclear efforts are not just the personal whim of the new president, reflecting his deep religious beliefs; the weapons development program began long before he took office and is part of the Islamic Republic's longstanding policy. Diplomatic means can prompt Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program only if they convince it that doing so is more appealing/less unappealing than continuing on its present course.  The efforts led by the EU-3 beginning in 2003 clearly failed to produce this cost-benefit calculus.  Those efforts confined themselves to economic "carrots" while avoiding any hint of "sticks," and either the "carrots" were insufficient or Iran was simply playing for time and not negotiating in good faith.  Although details of the negotiations were not disclosed, the second interpretation appears to be the correct one.  In fact, there was no breakthrough in any of the negotiations, either with the EU-3 or with Russia, and any time agreement did seem within reach, Iran immediately pulled back and returned to square one.  These tactics were actually encouraged by Russia and China, who voiced their strong opposition to any coercive action against Iran and thereby deprived negotiators of any hypothetical threat of negative consequences for Iran if agreement were not reached.  Thus, Iran remains in the enviable position of persisting in "no-cost" rejection of a policy change it wants to avoid. This situation raises two underlying questions: is there a way to sway Iran by appeals to reason, and is there a way to coerce Iran into accepting a diplomatic, i.e., non-military, solution.  Judging from Iran's past record and present behavior, the answer to the first question is probably negative. An answer to the second question can only be tested if those who negotiate with Iran are given coercive tools to use.  But if non-military tools such as UN Security Council sanctions are precluded by the threat of vetoes, then such tools must be sought outside the UN realm, in an arena like the IAEA (the stated preference of Russia and China), which has no enforcement authority and is even less likely to produce a solution (which is why it is also preferred by Iran). Thus, advocating a "diplomatic" solution while coming to the negotiating table with what amounts to an empty hand is almost a contradiction in terms. Were the negotiators to arrive with a strong hand, i.e., agreement among the major international actors that Iran is required immediately and unconditionally to accept the Security Council's demands -- including the open-ended suspension of activities and the return to full-scale inspections -- then awareness of the consequences of refusing to do so might stand a better chance of changing Iran's cost-benefit calculus.

Even at the negotiating table, the vast differences in fundamental beliefs, values and logic between the negotiating sides must be acknowledged and taken into account.  These differences probably contributed to the failure of previous negotiations or the breakdown of agreements and the subsequent reactions in the West to these failures.  And even if negotiations start from the departure point stipulated above, they will be long and arduous and a successful outcome is not assured. One cannot fault those who insist on a negotiated solution.  A negotiated solution is the best of all options.  However, starting the negotiations with what is clearly a losing hand could give Iran all it wants.  If those who negotiate with Iran are armed with nothing more than appeals to reason or to the Iranian regime's better nature, there will be no diplomatic solution to the problem, and Iran's nuclear weapons program will be either be stopped by military means or it will not be stopped at all.
 

Tunisian Reformist Researcher on Discrimination Against Christians in Egypt

Reformist Tunisian researcher Dr. Amel Grami from Manouba University in Tunis is a member of a joint international Muslim-Christian research group. She has published books on various Islamic topics such as freedom of faith in Islam and riddah (relinquishing the Muslim faith) in Islamic thought, as well as many articles in Arabic, French and Italian on reform in Islam, the status of women, and dialogue between Christianity and Islam. In November 2005, she participated in a conference held in Washington, D.C. for advancing the rights of Copts in Egypt; the conference was also attended by other reformists and human rights activists from across the Arab and Muslim world. At the conference, she presented a paper which included criticism of the persecution of the Christian Coptic population in Egypt and suggested ways of dealing with the issue.(1)

The following are excerpts: "A Country's Policy of Discrimination is One of the Most Central Factors in Harming Those of a Different Faith"..."Anyone who examines the persecution, the exclusion, and the marginalization that the Copts have suffered in recent years will find that the rejection of the other who belongs to a different religion has taken many forms - such as revulsion, contempt, defamation, curses, and public difficulty in tolerating the existence of the other. In some cases, the situation has reached the point of revoking the other's right to freedom, to expression, and to existence, and has even [led] to his elimination. It is clear that a country's policy of discrimination is one of the most central factors in harming those of a different faith... Whoever follows the words of the senior [Egyptian] officials discovers that they ceaselessly boast about the rules [set out in Koran 9:29] that oblige the ahl al-dhimma to pay jizya [poll tax] 'with willing submission,' and that they never stop praising the contracts that restrict non-Muslims in the areas of housing, external appearance, performance of their religious rituals, and upkeep of their houses of worship. It is no wonder, then, that the laws setting out worship continue to be handled as was customary hundreds of years ago, and that they differentiate between the rights of the 'majority' and the rights of the 'minority'..."The state's insistence that the construction, renovation, and decoration of churches are activities that require a [government] permit means that the state is incapable of accepting the changes of history and modern culture - including [the principle of] respecting the citizen's right to choose his  faith and to worship... It seems that the decision to prevent [free worship] reflects nothing but the desire of the 'majority' to be prominent at the expense of the 'minority' - which is forced to reduce its presence if [this presence] worries, embarrasses, or intimidates [the majority]...

"Accordingly... [the reality in Egypt is] that there are very few churches but many mosques; [Christian] houses of worship tend to be ramshackle, with dim lights and faded colors, in contrast to the lofty mosques that [are built to] seem ever-enduring, since 'Islam,' after all, 'is supreme over others and others are not supreme over it.' Thus, the state controls the physical symbols that express religious identity... The Copts' demand that the state enable them to establish and maintain churches is received [by the Egyptian public] as proof of their desire to compete with the Muslims... [as if] these are pesky demands aimed only at embarrassing members of the regime..."[But] in a country in which there are monasteries, and in which the voice of the muezzin reverberates along with the sound of the bell calling to  prayer, one cannot brandish the motto 'Islam is the solution' or call for the return of the 'Islamic caliphate' - and it is inconceivable for the constitution to set out that the state is Islamic. "Harassment Has Increased and the Discrimination Between Muslims and Christians has Gotten Worse"..."The second example of the violation of the Copts' religions rights is manifested in religious coercion, that is, in pushing women, particularly underage girls, to convert to Islam under pressure... In this framework,  there are cases of young girls abducted and forced to convert to Islam..."The [Egyptian] state favors one group at the expense of the other, and its various apparatuses have become entangled in acts of violence... Egypt has not managed to be objective [regarding all its citizens], and, like the other Arab countries, it has failed to secure the sovereignty of law and the implementation of social agreement among all [elements of its society]. This is because, in the eyes of the politicians and the decision makers, governing means repression, coercion, and punishment of those who do not obey. This is a clear violation of one of the most important articles of the Human Rights Convention..."It appears that the state does not recognize an individual's right to enjoy religious freedom that includes not only the right to choose a faith and a religion, but also the right to change his religion - or not to believe at all. Conversion to Islam cannot be by violence, since faith cannot be induced through compulsion and coercion... The state's intervention in the question of faith is proof of its responsibility - whether conscious or unconscious - for spreading [the accusation] of abandoning Islam [riddah, the penalty for which is death]... This means that the expropriation of religious freedom and the persecution and elimination of anyone who is different apply not only to the Copts, but also to Muslims who have a different view of the religion, or who seek to adopt another religion...


"State Institutions Employ a Policy of 'the Visible and the Hidden"

"Today, the 'majority' allows an individual who believes in a different religion to have a place in society, but [only] while reminding him that his value is not equal to that of a Muslim, and while constantly giving him the feeling that he is not a useful element [in society] and that he lacks the necessary qualifications. As we know, the required qualifications are not scientific qualifications, but religious ones. [Even] if the official [i.e. state] discourse claims that this is not the case, how [else] can we explain [the fact that] the Copts are being distanced from decision-making posts? And what does it mean when a state does not permit a Copt to hold a high position in society?..."The various state institutions employ a policy of 'the visible and the hidden.' Publicly, they imply that the state does not reject the Copts - that it condemns their persecution and never stops submitting important recommendations to all apparatuses on how to handle the crisis wisely. And indeed, in recent years the media has highlighted some [Coptic] history that in the past had been marginalized. Various works of art have stressed the coexistence that once prevailed between Muslims and Christians, and the scope of the Copts' contribution to the national struggle has been revealed. The number of encounters between Pope Shenouda III... and the official Islamic establishment represented by the sheikh of Al-Azhar has doubled, and political statements have multiplied regarding the fraternal relations that prevail between the members of both religions, and regarding the realization of national unity in Egypt. "But anyone who follows the events and the facts of daily life has noticed what the official discourse hides. Harassment has increased and the discrimination between Muslims and Christians has gotten worse... The state has not lifted a finger [to stop] the escalation in the discourse of the extremists, who support the Islamist movements and control the various institutions - particularly the media institutions...


"A Not Inconsiderable Number of Copts... Would Rather Submit to the Powerful Regime Than Fight it"

"Whether the Copts admit that they are being persecuted, deny it, or downplay the importance of the attacks against them, there is no doubt that fundamental human rights are being violated in Egypt and in other Arab countries, just as persecution of 'minorities' is a fact of life that cannot be denied - even if some Copts claim that they are satisfied with their situation and that they are against 'escalating [the struggle].' But isn't [their very] insistence on concealing the religious discrimination [against them] a sign of the restrictions and pressure that they are subject to, and [a sign of] the threats that they receive so that they will not reveal this local secret? Isn't the downplaying of the incidents in which churches were looted and destroyed, and Christian blood was spilled, evidence of the siege against 'the minority?'..."Feebleness, fear, and a sense of oppression and helplessness have infiltrated the souls of a not inconsiderable number of Copts, and they would rather remain silent than reveal the secret. They would rather submit to the powerful regime than fight it. This oppression has led them to accept the deeds of the ruling class, and to submit to the reality that is accepted as 'natural' in the society of the majority..."The Copts are divided in opinion not [only] with regard to the appropriate time to deal with this matter, but also with regard to the [appropriate] way of defending [themselves],... and with regard to terminology: Is it permissible to talk of 'persecution,' 'discrimination,' and 'violation [of rights],' or is it necessary to use expressions like 'being ignored' and 'neglected' by the state, or '[the state] turns a blind eye?' Similarly, they disagree on the methods of struggle against discrimination... and whether the issue of the Copts should be presented as a problem of a 'minority that is persecuted and besieged' or else considered within the broader framework of the lack of democracy in Egypt and the violation of fundamental human rights?...


"Defense of Religious Freedom Cannot Be Isolated From Defense of the Rest of the Fundamental Freedoms"

"Defense of religious freedom cannot be isolated from defense of the rest of the fundamental freedoms. It is important that every person in society, regardless of gender, color, race, and religion, enjoy the rights he deserves - such as the right to freedom, to respect, and to protection of his physical, mental, and spiritual wellbeing... The common denominator that must unite all levels of society is citizenship. Some of the backbones of citizenship are: equality in rights and obligations, and equality of all before the law... [Likewise,] one of the merits of the democratic state is that it does not consider people according to their faith, and does not assess them according to their affiliation with one religion or another, or according to their piousness. The goal that the state must pursue is for the individual to be capable of playing an active role in society while maintaining mutual constructive relations with others..."


Suggestions for Solving the Problem of Discrimination Against Christians in Egypt

In summary, Dr. Grami stated: "Global and local circumstances no longer allow the situation to continue as it is... and even though some elements have objected to raising the Coptic issue at the present time, public debate on this most sensitive Egyptian issue cannot be put off any longer." Dr. Grami added that there is already public discourse regarding a number of practical solutions to the problem, and enumerated some of them: "Building a truly democratic government in which rule of law will prevail instead of tribal rule, in which national and human affiliation will replace the focus on religious affiliation, with a separation between religion and state; changing the constitution and the laws so that they guarantee full equality for all...; implementing social justice by providing work opportunities and through [fair] distribution of resources among all [citizens]...; encouraging modern education... and curricula capable of developing a critical sense...; ending the hegemony of the religious establishment in all areas of life...; opposing the extremist religious movements that carry out acts of coercion and violence and do not respect freedom of religion; discarding the criteria of religious affiliation in order to establish a collective awareness that can unite the efforts of all in the service of the homeland... ; and reexamining the foundations for the operation of the media... The media establishment must spread the values of modernity and reflect the wealth of the cultural system..." By Reform Project/North African Reformist Thinkers
 

The Difficulties of Forming the New Government in Iraq

By Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli

Introduction

In the second parliamentary elections in Iraq, conducted on December 15 of last year, four political groups emerged with an overwhelming control of the seats in parliament. These groups, together controlling 252 of the total 275 seats, are the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) associated with Shi'ite political parties (130 seats)(1); the Kurdish Alliance (53 seats); the Iraqi Accord Front representing the Sunnis (44 seats); and the Iraqi National List of former prime minister Ayad Allawi primarily comprising secular candidates (25 seats). The remaining 23 seats are divided among various parties and individuals, the most significant being the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, another Sunni party, whose 11 seats complement the 44 seats of the Iraqi Accord Front. The results of the elections were contested on grounds of fraud and irregularities, which delayed the final allocation of seats by almost two months. The investigation by a team of U.N. and Arab League experts found few irregularities: The ultimate results announced by the Independent Electoral Committee on February 10, 2006 were nearly identical to the preliminary results. The international team also identified "the pressing need at this juncture of Iraq's history for a veritable national unity representing all the segments of the Iraqi people."(2)


The Leading Political Figures

The four leading winning groups in the elections are made up of various components which, in a crunch, may follow their own religious, sectarian, tribal, regional, or even personal interests. Indeed, the tensions and disagreements within and among them could undermine the prospects of forming a stable and effectively operating government in the next four years. The UIA itself is a confederation of four political parties and independent candidates - the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) under Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim; al-Da'wa Party, under the current Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari; the Fadhila Party [Virtue Party] under Dr. Nadeem al-Jabiri; and the Sadrists, the supporters of the young Islamic radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The Kurdish Alliance is made up of the two leading Kurdish parties - the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani, the current president of Iraq, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party under Mas'oud Barzani, the President of Kurdistan. There are four leading figures and groupings in the Sunni parties. The Iraqi Accord Front, including the Conference of the People of Iraq, under 'Adnan al-Duleimi; the Islamic Party, under Tariq al-Hashemi; the National Dialogue Front, under Sheikh Khalaf al-'Alyan; and the Council for National Dialogue, under Saleh al-Mutlak.


The Selection of a Prime Minister

Under the Iraqi constitution, the party with the largest number of seats designates the prime minister, although it is the President's Council (the President of the Republic and his two Vice Presidents) which asks a member of parliament to form a new government. While the election results were being contested, the UIA, the group with the largest number of parliamentary seats, was engaged in an intense internal contest for the selection of its candidate for the post of prime minister. Initially, four candidates competed, but eventually the real competition was reduced to that between the current Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari from al-Da'wa Party and 'Adil Abd Al-Mahdi, the vice president from SCIRI. The new prime minister will serve for four years under the constitution approved in a referendum in October 2005.


The Method for Selecting the Prime Minister

The two key candidates and their supporters advocated two opposing methods of selection: Abd al-Mahdi supporters favored selection based on consensus; al-Ja'fari supporters favored selection by a vote among the 130 UIA members of parliament. The second method emerged with the upper hand, thanks greatly to the weight of the 30 Sadrists who all voted for al-Ja'fari. The London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat has reported that, on the eve of the voting, Muqtada al-Sadr called some of the Shi'ite leaders and threatened a civil war if al-Ja'fari was not selected.(3) Given al-Sadr's record of erratic behavior, the story cannot be readily discounted. It was also suggested that as a quid pro quo for the Sadrists' votes for him, al-Ja'fari will drop all legal cases against them, most of them arising from the rebellion in Najaf and Karbala in 2004 and, more significantly, the arrest warrant pending against al-Sadr for the murder of a major Shi'ite figure, Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, shortly after the occupation of Iraq.(4)When the votes were counted, al-Ja'fari received 65 votes and Abd Al-Mahdi, 64. Al-Ja'fari was declared the winner, but his margin of victory represented neither a great vote of confidence for someone who had already been serving as a prime minister for almost a year, nor a propitious start for the challenges ahead. Al-Sadr emerged from this exercise as a person with political clout, which he quickly used in a series of well-publicized visits to neighboring countries where he was treated as a significant political figure. In the course of less than four weeks, he was received by the heads of state of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan.  One way or another, al-Sadr has become part of the Iraqi political landscape - a force to be reckoned with. Al-Sadr has two potent opponents - the Kurds and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of SCIRI. If these two political groups should join forces with Allawi and the Sunnis, an entirely new political situation could emerge.


Foreseen Delays in Forming a Government

The formation of the first Iraqi government following the elections of January 30, 2005 took approximately four months. At that time, there were only two major groups negotiating a deal, and one of the two, the UIA, had an absolute, though not a two-thirds, majority in the National Assembly. This time, there are four major groups in the newly-elected parliament, and none with an absolute majority. To form a new government, and with it the right to govern, a candidate needs the support of all of the UIA and at least one more group from among the four. Given that al-Ja'fari is not popular outside his own Da'wa party and the Sadrists, who jointly control fewer than half of UIA's 130 seats, it is hardly surprising that various groups are already maneuvering to identify alternative candidates. The process of forming a coalition is likely to be neither easy nor quick. Already many of the potential partners have declared their conditions, or red lines - a euphemism for a veto - about potential candidates and about critical issues. Notwithstanding his admonition that whoever draws these lines "will find himself [entangled] inside them,"(5) Talabani reminded the UIA that nomination does not necessarily mean appointment, and that while al-Ja'fari can be approved in parliament by a simple majority of 138 members, he would in fact need 184 votes, or two-thirds of the members of parliament, to be able to govern effectively, and to effect certain changes that would require two-thirds of the votes in parliament.(6) The Kurds have their own conditions about the federalism of Kurdistan and about the future of Kirkuk, as will be explained below.


Contentions About Political Figures

The political figure who raises the highest level of contention is al-Ja'fari himself. He has been criticized for performing poorly as prime minister. The country remains in a severe state of turmoil and is subject to daily terrorist attacks. Frightened by random violence, many Iraqis rarely venture out of their homes. The supply of electricity and gasoline remains irregular, and the high rate of unemployment shows no sign of abating. Above all, al-Ja'fari is now seen as beholden to the erratic Islamist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose supporters' votes were crucial to putting al-Ja'fari ahead of his closest competitor. There is a genuine concern that al-Ja'fari's government might, under pressure from al-Sadr, pull Iraq further into an Iranian-style theocracy. The other political figure who raises a great deal of contention is Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister, who is a secular Shi'ite. Al-Ja'fari, and, even more, the Sadrists who supported him, have declared their opposition to Allawi's joining the new government. Al-Ja'fari's objection may have to do with Allawi's past Ba'thist association, and the Sadrists cannot forgive him for crushing, with considerable force, their rebellion against the Shi'ite marja'iyah in Najaf and Karbala and against the multinational forces in 2004. Moreover, Allawi's secularism is anathema to a group which firmly believes that the only good government is a government based on shari'a (Islamic law). (7)


Political Maneuvering

There is a broad consensus among the various political groupings, including elements of the UIA, that the new government should be a government of "national salvation," that brings under its umbrella all the political forces in Iraq. The United States stands firmly behind this proposition, for it is indeed unlikely that the Sunni-guided insurgency can be brought under control unless the Sunni representatives in Parliament are fully represented in the new government. The two Sunni groups in Parliament, which together control 55 seats, have entered into a broader coalition with Allawi's National List, thereby creating the second largest faction in Parliament with 80 seats. The new group is called the Council for National Action (majlis al-'amal al-watani), which will act as an integrated parliamentary faction in negotiations with the designated prime minister on the formation of a new government. They expect to increase their number to 88 by attracting individuals or representatives from small groups. In the words of one of its members - Izzat al-Shahbandar - all the faction's components are nationalist groups which reject ethnic politics. Its mission "is national unity, without which Iraq will descend into the abyss."(8) Another problem for al-Ja'fari is posed by the head of the UIA, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who heads SCIRI and who believes that the post of prime minister belongs to his party because it has a much larger political base than al-Ja'fari's Da'wa Party, and is negotiating with prospective coalition partners behind al-Ja'fari's back. While he is on record in support of the democratic choice of al-Ja'fari, his actions are not consistent with his words. He is known to have been holding talks, jointly with Adil Abd Al-Mahdi who was defeated by al-Ja'fari by one vote, with the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani and with the Sunni leader 'Adnan al-Duleimi. Al-Hakim has also met separately with the other Kurdish leader Mas'oud Barzani, the president of Kurdistan.(9) Given Al-Hakim's disappointment at the selection of al-Ja'fari over SCIRI's candidate Abd al-Mahdi, it is a safe assumption that he is not exactly conducting meetings to mobilize support for the candidacy of al-Ja'fari. While SCIRI and its leader al-Hakim have maintained a strategic alliance with the Kurds, al-Ja'fari, as prime minister, has had less than warm relations with Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq. Their conflicts and disagreements made front page news for a long time in the free Iraqi press. The Kurds have been particularly disappointed with al-Ja'fari's refusal to place the Kirkuk issue on the agenda. Talabani and al-Ja'fari have even feuded over one of Saddam's palaces, an issue finally resolved with the help of the Kurdish militia, the Peshmerga. Al-Ja'fari must also not ignore the fourth component of the UIA, the Fadhila Party [the Virtue Party] which has its own agenda and its own demands which, if not satisfied, might cause it to bolt into the arms of a different political configuration. The Al-Fadhila party seems not to have taken part in the negotiations for the next government. Another criticism of al-Ja'fari, voiced by the Najaf News Network, is that by insisting on his reelection, Al-Ja'fari has galvanized all the forces, national and international, that are opposed to the Shi'a rise to power in Iraq, thus forcing him to make concessions to the detriment of the Shi'a and to their fundamental interests.(10)


Critical Issues Facing the Formation of Government

When the maneuvering subsides, and the actual bargaining goes into high gear, there will be a number of issues, some extremely thorny, placed on the negotiating table. Among them are the following:


The Coalition Government

Since no political party commands an absolute majority in the new parliament, a coalition government is inevitable. The questions are what kind of coalition will be formed, who will be in it and at what a price. The starting issue is whether the new government will be another coalition between the Shi'a and the Kurds, or a national unity government that will include, in addition to these two groups, the Sunnis and the secular members of Allawi's party. Hamid Majid Mousa, the Secretary General of the Communist Party and a member of Allawi's group, has asserted that the attempts to keep Allawi out have foiled attempts to form a new government.(11) In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Shi'a shrines on February 23, the likelihood of a national government has increased. There is, however, a growing assumption that the heads of most of the political parties, with the open support of the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, will demand that the UIA come up with a candidate other than al-Ja'fari. In this context, the convening of the parliament, required by the constitution to take place on February 25, was postponed for two weeks in order to give the various factions more time to negotiate.(12)


The Issue of Federalism

There is a broad consensus in Iraq that the Kurdish region should remain federated - in other words, autonomous - under a unified Iraq. Al-Hakim, the head of SCIRI, has repeatedly announced his intention to create a similar federated region in southern Iraq. The Sunnis, supported by the Sadrists, strongly oppose this idea because it will deny the Sunnis the benefits of oil revenues, as these revenues will accrue solely to the Kurds and the Shi'a. The opponents of federalism demand a constitutional revision that would render such a federal structure unconstitutional. The UIA is opposed to major revisions in the constitution which would deny them the option of federating the southern governorates on the pattern of the Kurdish north.


The Issue of Kirkuk

The Kurds argue that al-Ja'fari has reneged on a commitment that the government would discuss the issue of Kirkuk's future - an issue that they rank second in importance only to federation of the three autonomous Kurdish provinces. They want the issue resolved through a referendum which they believe they have the votes to win. The Kurds are unlikely to support any prime minister who does not offer to deal with this issue in a manner favorable to their aspirations. As a condition of supporting al-Ja'fari, the Kurds demand a commitment by the prospective prime minister to conduct a census of Kirkuk, to be followed by a plebiscite that would determine whether the city will be incorporated into Kurdistan. They also demand a major role for the Kurdish ministers in the new government.(13) The Kurds realize, as they have said through one of their negotiators Fuad Ma'ssoum, that they can tip the scales between the UIA's candidate and the newly established Allawi-Sunni Coalition's candidate.(14) In practice, the Kurds would prefer a UIA candidate, provided that candidate is not al-Ja'fari.


The Issue of Deba'thification

There are two extremes on this issue. On one side are the Sadrists, who demand that the deba'thification of Iraq must go ahead at full speed with the summary execution of Saddam Hussein; on the other side are the Sunnis, who feel that they have been sufficiently victimized by the policy of deba'thification, and that it is time to move on and unify the country. Holding a middle ground is the Allawi group, which has taken a pragmatic view about deba'thification, namely that the policy should be applied only to the most senior elements of the former ruling Ba'th Party. This view is also shared by the Kurds, whose leader, Talabani, has vowed that, as president, he will never sign execution orders for Saddam Hussein.


The Issue of a Timetable for Withdrawal

The Sunnis and the Sadrists find themselves in agreement regarding the demand to set a timetable for the withdrawal of multinational forces from Iraq. They share the view that insurgency, terrorism and economic dislocation are caused by the occupation forces, and that the sooner they leave, the better Iraq is likely to be. For them, setting a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces is second only to preventing the federalization of Iraq. The Kurds want the multinational forces to stay until the resistance has been brought under control and the Shi'a, with the blessings of their spiritual leader Ayatollah al-Sistani, have taken a pragmatic view.


The Issue of the Militias

There are three significant militias - the Kurdish Peshmerga, SCIRI's Iran-supported Badr Brigade, and al-Sadr's Jeish al-Mahdi, which may also be getting support from Iran. In rather blunt language, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said the United States will not agree to the existence of militias connected with sectarian elements in the new government. He said the American taxpayers wish to see their tax money spent properly and they do not wish to see it spent on [military] forces run by sectarian ministers.(15) The ambassador's admonition may have been directed primarily at the Badr Brigade, which is suspected of committing murders and acts of terrorism against the Sunnis. (See next paragraph.)


Key Security Ministries

There are four key security posts - the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Security Adviser, and the head of the intelligence service. The U.S. Ambassador, who is directly involved in many of the negotiations between party leaders about the formation of the new government, has expressed the view that all the four positions should be held by individuals not connected with sectarian parties.(16) The most controversial figure is the Minister of Interior, Banyan Jabber Solagh, whose ministry was found to be running illegal prisons and torture chambers, most of whose victims are Sunnis. The Sunnis also claim that the police and security forces under the Ministry of the Interior are responsible for the assassination of numerous Sunni clerics, and they want Solagh out.  However, he is a member of SCIRI, which is supported by the Badr Militia. Should al-Ja'fari succeed in forming a government, it will be difficult for him to replace Solagh, as doing so woul doffend the other branch of the UIA, whose support for al-Ja'fari is far from solid.(17) Al-Ja'fari was equally blunt, characterizing the statement by the U.S. Ambassador as "his government's point of view." He asserted that Iraq "makes its own decisions, by Iraqi methods and through Iraqi vision, without the intervention of any [other] country."(18) When agreement is reached on the issues indicated above - and some will no doubt be swept under the carpet for consideration at a later date - a new round of negotiations will start concerning the allocation of the so-called 16 sovereign posts: the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of the parliament - each  with two deputies; the ministers of foreign affairs, finance, interior, defense, and petroleum; the national security adviser; and the chief of intelligence. And, finally, the parties will have to agree on the size of the cabinet and how the posts will be distributed among competing demands and party interests.


Criticism of the U.S. Ambassador

The U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has maintained a high profile in the various meetings regarding the formation of a new government. He also been seen sharing the podium in news conferences involving senior Iraqi leaders, including the president. It is not surprising that the ambassador is not well-liked by most of the Shi'a, who refer to him as "Ambassador of the Sunnis" and as "Abu Omar" or "Mullah Khlil," after Mullah Omar of the Taliban.(19) Even the daily al-Sabah, a semi-official newspaper, published an article bearing the headline "The American Ambassador carries out the responsibility of the high commissioner." In the opening sentence, the daily said, "The difference between the function of an ambassador and that of a high commissioner designated by his country to govern an occupied land has disappeared."(20)


Conclusion

This paper has sought to highlight some of the complexities and issues involved in the formation of a new Iraq government that is supposed to govern a country in deep crisis for the next four years. The chances of concluding the arduous process of forming a coalition may have been enhanced by the recent terrorist attack on major Shi'ite shrines in Samaraa, and the subsequent retaliation against Sunni mosques in many parts of Iraq. The danger of a civil war resulting from violence against the holy places of both communities could spur action to reach a compromise faster than would otherwise have been possible. But even a faster process may be slower than what Iraq needs in terms of a strong and stable government that is capable of addressing the burning national issues of security and economic reconstruction. The decision on who will be Iraq's next prime minister will be of decisive import for the question of how the country might be successfully navigated through turbulent waters.



Endnotes:
(1) Including two seats from al-Rissaliyyun (associated with Muqtada al-Sadr).
(2) D. Abdul Khaliq Hussein, Iraqparliament.com/article/html February 12, 2006.
(3) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 17, 2006.
(4) Al-Zaman (Baghdad), February 16, 2006.
(5)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 17, 2006.
(6)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat  (London), February 19, 2006.
(7)Al-Zaman  (Baghdad), February 12, 2006.
(8)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 21, 2006.
(9) www.sotaliraq.com (an independent electronic daily), February 21, 2005.
(10) As'ad Rashid, Does al-Ja'fari Wish to Destroy the Iraqi Shi'a? Karbala News Agency, February 19, 2006.
(11) Al-Zaman  (Baghdad), February 23, 2006.
(12)Al-Quds Al-'Arabi (London), February 24, 2006.
(13)Al-Mada  (Baghdad), February 14, 2006.
(14)Al-Zaman (Baghdad) February 20, 2006.
(15)Al-Mada (Baghdad), February 21, 2006.
(16)Al-Sabah (Baghdad), February 21, 2006.
(17) www.annabaa.org (February 17, 2006).
(18)Al-Sabah (Baghdad), February 22, 2006.
(19) As'ad Rashid, Najaf News Network,  February 20, 2006.
(20)Al-Sabah (Baghdad), February 22, 2006.



 

The Strategic Logic of Israel's Security Barrier

By Col. (Res.) Danny Tirza, The IDF's Chief Architect for the Security Fence

The main reason for the delay in building the security fence was because the line of the fence was a major issue of political debate inside Israel. The government didn't want to build it, out of concern that any line on the ground would have a political meaning in future negotiations. In all government decisions it was emphasized that the line the army was building was only a security line and it would not be the line for future negotiations. We had to consider Israel's security needs, and also the rights of the people who live in the area in order to minimize the disruption of their lives. Israel's Supreme Court said we had to give greater weight to the daily life of the Palestinians, so we changed the route in some places, and in other places we changed the procedures that enable people to cross from one side of the fence to the other.

Ben-Gurion International Airport is only eleven kilometers from the "green line," and Israel has real concerns over the potential threat of missiles launched against aircraft. Al-Qaeda tried to shoot down an Israeli Arkia aircraft with a missile in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 and it was a miracle that nobody was killed at that time. Due to weather conditions, there are seventy days a year when aircraft flying in and out of Israel must fly above the West Bank. We wanted to build a double fence in the area near the airport in order to secure it from missiles, but there are 19,000 Palestinians living in this area and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Israel could not leave people to live in enclaves.

Why wasn't the fence built on the "green line" - the 1949 ceasefire line? From a security perspective, mountains dominate valleys. To provide security, Israel must control the high ground in order to dominate the area and not have others dominate us. The "green line" leaves Israel in a fragile security situation.


The Debate Over Where to Build the Fence

The government of Israel took a decision to build a fence between the West Bank and Israel in 1996, but its construction was delayed, first of all, because of the costs involved. At the time, the project was expected to cost about 2 billion shekels; today we know that it will cost about 10 billion shekels - about $2 billion. But the main reason for the delay involved the political implications of the route of the fence. Some Israelis believe that the fence should be built along the Jordan River between Jordan and Israel. Others believe that the fence should be built along the "green line" - what had been the border between Israel and Jordan between 1949 and 1967. Still others believe the fence should run inside Israel and separate Israeli Arabs who live near the fence from Israel. There are also those who believe it should run deep inside the West Bank and include most of the settlements. There is a big debate going on about where the line should be, and initially the government took no decision, trying to stay away from the debate. At the end of September 2000, the Palestinians started a campaign of violence against Israel that resulted in the murder of 1,148 people, most of them civilians, in acts of terror committed inside Israel. It was very easy for terrorists to pass from the West Bank to Israel because there were no natural or man-made obstacles to stop them. The terror acts mounted until Israel saw 139 people murdered in one month, in March 2002. The public pressed the government to build a barrier between Israelis and Palestinians, and although the government didn't want to do it, out of concern that any line on the ground would have a political meaning in future negotiations, it was forced by public opinion to build the fence. The government ordered the army to find a route for the fence between Israel and the West Bank that would stop the terror but would not be a political border. In all the government decisions it was emphasized that the line the army was building was only a security line and it would not be the line for future negotiations. The line of the fence is not going to set the borders of Israel. We understand that at the end of the day the only line will be the one agreed upon by the two sides.


Major Concerns to Protect Palestinian Rights

In drawing the line of the fence, we had to consider Israel's security needs, and also the rights of the people who live in the area in order to minimize the disruption of their lives. We did not just draw lines on a map. We went out with the commanders and the village heads to find the right line on the ground. After we had built 145 kilometers of fence, Israel's Supreme Court instructed us to give greater weight to the daily life of the Palestinians. So we changed the route of the fence in some places, and in other places we changed the procedures that enable people to cross from one side of the fence to the other. The Supreme Court ruled that Israel has the right to build a fence to defend its population, but we cannot take all the land that we want for the sake of security. There has to be a balance of security and humanitarian concerns, taking into account the needs of those most affected by the fence. In urban areas where there is not enough space, we are building a concrete wall, but the wall is only 5 percent of the total project, which will be about 726 kilometers long. We also understand that we have to take the needs of people into consideration, and we sometimes have to build new roads for the villagers. At the end of the project there will be fewer than 7,000 people with Palestinian IDs on the Israeli side of the fence, but there will be a lot of Israelis living east of the fence. The army is seizing the land for the fence only temporarily. The owners will receive compensation annually for the use of the land, and we try to build on public land wherever possible. We have also replanted more than 90,000 trees in the area to try to minimize the damage to local farmers. Israel is not fighting against the Palestinian people; we are fighting the terror organizations.


Protecting Jerusalem

In Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, 423 people were killed and about 6,000 were wounded in terror acts. The line of the fence in Jerusalem follows largely the municipal boundaries. It will have eleven terminals for people to cross. One terminal is already working between Bethlehem and Jerusalem. It looks like an airport terminal and people can cross from one side to the other in minutes. We have also provided services for people living east of the fence. In one place we gave land for a school so pupils won't have to cross a checkpoint every day. In other places we have to build clinics so the population won't have to cross into Jerusalem. We deal with these questions every day, everywhere along the fence.


Protecting Israel's International Airport

Ben-Gurion International Airport is only eleven kilometers from the "green line," and Israel has real concerns over the potential threat of missiles launched against aircraft. Al-Qaeda tried to shoot down an Israeli Arkia aircraft with a missile in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 and they missed. It was a miracle that nobody was killed at that time. In Israel, all the aircraft come from the west and land from west to east, then take off from east to west over the Mediterranean Sea. But due to weather conditions, there are seventy days a year when the aircraft must fly in the opposite direction, above the West Bank. We wanted to build a double fence in the area near the airport in order to secure it from missiles, but there are 19,000 Palestinians living in this area. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saw the maps and said Israel could not cause people to live in enclaves, so the government decided not to build a double fence in this area at this time. Route 443 is the only alternative road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in addition to Route 1 - the main road. But we had to consider the 47,000 Palestinians living west of the road, and we will have to find ways to defend this road without creating an enclave. Some Israeli political leaders wanted to build an additional security fence to the east, between the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, because we believe the Jordan Valley is a strategic area that Israel needs to control. But the way to accomplish this is not by building a fence. The fence is solely a defensive issue and is not a way to claim land. Israel is building a security fence in order to defend itself. Its route reflects a balance between security and humanitarian considerations. We look forward to a future when there will be no need for such measures. We will be glad to tear down the fences and live in peace with our neighbors. But until that time comes, we are determined to carry through with this defensive project.



Col. (Res.) Danny Tirza is in charge of planning the security fence between the West Bank and Israel, Israel's largest infrastructure project. Since 1994, Col. Tirza has headed a special staff in the IDF Central Command in charge of regional strategic planning. He has taken part in formulating Israel's security positions in negotiations with the Palestinians and has participated in various stages of the negotiations. Col. Tirza specializes in the geography of Judea and Samaria, the Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem. This Jerusalem Issue Brief is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs in Jerusalem on January 26, 2006.


[IMRA: A major source of confusion over the security barrier is that some of its major proponents clearly see it as a device to retreat as closely to the Green Line without subjecting the retreat to the need for any serious democratic process. Thus their ex-fence scenario is that Israel hides behind the fence and hopes for the best.  In contrast, others supporting the fence see it as a barrier blocking Palestinian terrorists while the IDF continues to act on an ongoing basis beyond the fence (that's "ongoing" rather than only on an exceptional basis - as shown in Gaza, 300 rockets can be fired and it still isn't "exceptional").]