Commentary of the
Week: Deal with Egypt a fig leaf for retreat
By Dr. Aaron Lerner, World Jewish News Agency
International Commentator and IMRA Director, Israel.
September, 1, 2005
This
week the Knesset was treated to a typical Oslo era document when it
considered the "Agreed Arrangements Regarding The Deployment of a Designated
Force of Border Guards Along The Border in the Rafah Area" All the t's are
crossed and all the i's are dotted but the underlying logic for the need for
the arrangement in the first place was missing altogether.
A quick review: Egypt is obligated to prevent the smuggling of weapons
across Sinai into Gaza that could be used against Israel per the Peace
Treaty Between Israel And Egypt signed on March 26, 1979:
"...Article III 2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of
belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not
committed from within its territory.
What was preventing Egypt from stopping the smuggling? The explanation
typically palmed off by Israeli officials was that the treaty between Israel
and Egypt prevented the Egyptians from deploying enough forces. This was
usually a sufficient answer - since Israeli reporters and politicians alike
rarely actually make the effort to read documents.
Here's what the Treaty says: Annex I, Article II, Subparagraph 1.c.2.
"Egyptian civil police will be stationed in Zone C" (the area adjacent to
the border). Subparagraph 1.c.3.states that they will be "armed with light
weapons". Assault rifles qualify as "light weapons".
What does the Government of Israel think this means? Amira Oron, an Israel
Foreign Ministry spokesperson, confirmed to IMRA on 19 May 2004 that the
Treaty Between Israel and Egypt sets no limit on the number of Egyptian
police armed with assault rifles that Egypt can deploy in the border area
adjacent to the Gaza Strip and that no limits were introduced after the
Treaty was signed.
So what was preventing Egypt from stopping the smuggling? Apologists argued
that the poor training and lower quality of Egyptian civil police was
the source of the problem, hence the idea of replacing them with a military
force barred from the demilitarized area near the border. But just as Annex
I, Article II, Subparagraph 1.c.2 of the Treaty did not put a numerical
limit on the "Egyptian civil police" deployed in the area, it placed no
restriction on who could serve in the "Egyptian civil police" nor the terms
of service in the "Egyptian civil police." Egypt needs better people in the
"Egyptian civil police" deployed to fight the smugglers? Fine. Let them
recruit them from the ranks of their most elite army units - but they should
operate as "Egyptian civil police" - not a force linked by command and
control to forces barred by the Treaty from the area. This agreement isn't
really to stop smuggling - Egypt was already obligated to do it and had the
means to honor its obligations. This agreement is instead a fig leaf for
Israeli retreat.
And a fast retreat at that.
Back on July 5, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz told a special joint session of
the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee and the Foreign Affairs
and Defense Committee that Israel would review how effectively the Egyptians
and Palestinians halt the smuggling of weapons from Egypt to the Gaza Strip
through the end of this year before deciding on withdrawing from the
Philadelphi Corridor - the narrow strip between Egypt and Gaza. Now Mofaz
doesn't want to even wait around to see what happens.
Commentary of the last week
The Landau
Candidacy
By Dr. Aaron Lerner, World Jewish News Agency
International Commentator and IMRA Director, Israel.
MK Uzi Landau's candidacy for the chairmanship of the Likud and its
candidate for prime minister may be the only remaining bright spot in the
Israeli political scene. Landau's universally recognized integrity and
demonstrated willingness to put national over personal interest sets him
apart from the rest of the field.
MIT Ph.D. Landau is hardly an ivory tower ideologue. Though many may recall
how Landau, as Minister of Internal Security in the first Sharon
Administration, closed down Orient House and carefully worked to restore
Israeli access to the Temple Mount, perhaps the best illustration of Uzi
Landau's performance in office was the dramatic change in the handling of
Israeli Arab rioters during his tenure. The deaths of Israeli Arab rioters
in Wadi Ara during the Barak administration poisoned the atmosphere creating
a situation that law enforcement officials seemed to have to choose between
enforcing the law and avoiding potentially dangerous confrontation. Under
Landau's leadership the police achieved both. Rioters were photographed in
the act but only detained on the scene as a last resort in the case of a
truly life threatening situation. Instead the rioters were arrested in the
middle of the night as their neighbors slept. As a finishing touch, the
police came equipped with the incriminating photographs to silence families
protesting the innocence of the rioters being detained. The incidents of
rioting plummeted.
But is Landau's candidacy relevant?
It depends in part on the situation in the country when the primaries are
held. If there is relative calm and only minor diplomatic pressure on Israel
at the time of the vote then we may be in for a horse race between Netanyahu
and Sharon with Landau far behind. On the other hand, if the seeds of
retreat already begin bearing their poisoned fruit along with heavy
diplomatic pressure on Israel for more concessions an angry Likud membership
may opt to punish the politicians responsible for the disaster and reward
Landau for his steadfast opposition to retreat.
In the meantime Landau's challenge is to rebuff efforts by the media, and
his competition, to marginalize him. Only time will tell if he has the
resources to contend with the well financed Sharon and Netanyahu campaigns.