COMMENTARY OF THE WEEK BY DR. AARON LERNER

No. This wasn't the conversation of two Israeli diehard right wingers. It was Army Radio's Razi Barkai and Israel Television Channel Two Political Correspondent Rina Matzliach talking live on Channel Two's early evening "News Room" program this Wednesday. Their remarks were sparked by a dramatic decline in support for disengagement by the general public and a series of recent negative assessments by leading security men of the consequences of retreat. In truth public support for retreat has been soft all along.  Go beyond the hard core retreat supporters from the Left and some self serving politicians that are ostensibly from the Right and you have a lot of people who haven't put much thought to the question before they told pollsters that they support retreat.

 

Will the poll numbers continue to shift?

On the one hand, the media certainly has given the story coverage, so there is the possibility of a snowball effect bolstered by recent highly publicized remarks by defense experts against retreat and a barrage of remarks by Leftists politicians that this is just the first of many retreats to come. On the other hand, if the Israeli media becomes convinced that public opposition to retreat can actually stop implementation of Sharon's disengagement plan this August they may pull all the stops in an effort to restore public support for retreat. Even if the polls continue to decline it is far from clear that this will stop the retreat. That would take a vote of either the Israeli Cabinet or the Knesset.  In both forums stopping retreat would mean politicians having to risk their day jobs today in the hopes that voters would reward them in the future - a trade-off that many Likud politicians repeatedly declined to take over this past year. Then again, with some Labor Party leaders indicating they are going to precipitate an election immediately after the retreat anyway, Likud politicians may start worrying more about what the anti-retreat dominated Central Committee thinks (they decide on the party list) than what Sharon does.

One thing is certain.  It won't be boring here.

 

Israel's "Thought Police" - Wasting Police Resources

June 9,  2005

By Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis), World Jewish News Agency International Commentator. Website: http://www.imra.org.il 

Israel doesn't have a "thought police" to suppress public protest against Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan.  The police spending hours interrogating people for distributing orange ribbons, stickers and informational pamphlets are regular cops who would otherwise be working on preventing or solving real crimes.   By the same token, the prosecutors who now have to wade through the paperwork generated by these spurious investigations are from a special "thought prosecution" team.

They are diverting their resources - as well as the resources of the Israeli court system - from the swift delivery of justice in real cases. And, unfortunately, Israel has more than enough real crime to keep the cops and the courts busy. It didn't have to be this way. From the very start Attorney General Menachem Mazuz could have issued clear guidelines as to what constitutes illegal incitement. 

Clear and intuitive guidelines that prohibit calls to hurt individuals or groups and leave the rest protected by the right to freedom of speech. But he didn't. Mazuz's patchwork of comments for more than a year left both police and protestors uncertain as to what citizens can do without facing the risk of being ID'd, interrogated - and possibly even prosecuted for incitement.

When Menachem Mazuz was appointed attorney general he was roundly praised by his colleagues for his great intellect and skills, so it's hard to accept that he has simply been clumsy, lazy or incompetent. Unfortunately, the alternative explanation is that Mazuz has put his ideologically driven desire to suppress opposition to withdrawal above his professional obligations.

POLLS

Poll: 21% more concerned about violence, 11% blame weak police, 4.4% know someone who experienced physical violence in last 3 months. Telephone poll carried out by "Brain Base" ["Maagar Mochot"] of a representative sample of 501 adult Israelis (including Israeli Arabs) under the direction of Prof. Y.Katz for Israel Channel Ten Television's "All Morning" program on 3 June 2005. Are you more or less concerned about violence than in the past? More 21% Same 73% Less 6% Were you or any of your family or friends hurt as a result of violence in the last three months? No 79% Yes 13% Other 8%

Of those who replied yes: What kind of violence? 23% Physical (hitting, spitting, attacking, burning, knifing, pushing,  destruction of property) 41% Verbal (curses, threats, obscene gestures, harassment) 11% Both  physical and verbal 25% Other (sexual harassment, dangerous driving) How do you think you would react to a violent incident? Ignore 39% Respond verbally 21% Respond physically 17% Call the police 18% Other 5%

What do you think is the main reason for the increase in violence in Israeli society? Failure of educational home 27% Failure of educational system 21% Economic situation 14% Weak police 11% Forgiving court system 10% Security situation 6% New immigrants 3% Other 8%

 

 

Mr. Sharon isn't fiddling as Israel burns - he has a full orchestra,   
June 16,  2005

If  Nero figuratively fiddled while Rome was burning, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has a full symphony orchestra playing with him as he sucks the Jewish State into an incredibly bizarre self inflicted disaster. A disaster Mr. Sharon has imposed on Israel in the desperate hope that this  will keep the criminal justice system at bay.

No.  This isn't some half-baked conspiracy theory from right wing radicals. Two senior Israeli reporters, Raviv Drucker of Israel's Channel Ten TV and Ofer Shelach of Yediot Aharonot - hardly right wingers - teamed together to investigate what was really behind Sharon's retreat plan.  And their startling conclusion after speaking with people on the inside:  Sharon's desperate desire to avoid indictment for various illegal transactions.

The irony? As Channel Two correspondent Amnon Abromovitz put it, Mr. Sharon enjoys the protection of retreat supporters - protected "like an Etrog", the citrus fruit used in ceremonies during Succoth.  The Etrog is very valuable through the holiday, but the phrase "like an Etrog after Succoth" aptly describes Mr. Sharon's status after the retreat from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria is completed and retreat supporters reach the conclusion that he won't retreat any more in the foreseeable future. Simply put: Mr. Sharon is retreating from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria - uprooting many thousands of Jews from their homes - to only temporarily postpone his being hit with criminal charges. Prime Minister Sharon isn't alone.  Almost everywhere you turn on the Israeli scene there are individuals and grouping aiding and abetting this madness: There were enough ministers and MKs to stop the plan every step along the way if they were willing to vote their consciences instead of for their own narrow short term interests. There were enough security officials at the top echelons convinced that the retreat plan is a terrible mistake, but it is almost unheard of in Israel to resign a post in order to warn the nation of disastrous policy.  Instead of warning the nation we are witness to some security people taking the all too familiar "yihyeh b'seder" (it will be ok) approach as they curry favor with the Sharon team.

 

 Consider some of the recently published assertions by some security people that retreat isn't a problem because Israel will always have a free hand to act in the Gaza Strip - an assertion that recklessly ignores the many highly likely post-retreat scenarios under which Israel's ability to act effectively against a war of attrition launched from Gaza would be seriously restricted.

The Foreign Ministry has also fallen into lock-step with the program, sacrificing Israel's interests in the name of expedience.  Consider the ongoing praise for Egypt's so-called "constructive role" - this when in truth Egypt has been the primary source for destabilizing weapons for the terrorists and has consistently pursued the goal of keeping the various illegal Palestinian militias armed and intact. Attorney General Mazuz has also made an important contribution to Mr. Sharon's "symphony", both in the way that he has handled the cases against the beleaguered prime minister and in the way that he allowed the police to try and shackle the retreat protest movement by declining to come up with clear, intuitive and reasonable guidelines regarding limits on protest. Mr. Sharon's "symphony" would not be complete without the Israeli media's support for retreat.   The biggest story of this generation with barely a column inch or a broadcast minute with any depth to expose the thin veneer of logic ostensibly behind the plan. It is far from clear if the retreat plan has reached the point on no return. But one thing is certain: either way this insanity will cost Israel dearly.

 

Retreating without a Plan B. Ignoring Post Retreat Limitations

 June 23,  2005

"There is no military operation we can do today and won't be able to do in the future," proclaimed Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi as he briefed reporters yesterday. That's Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi, not MK Giladi or Professor Giladi. One doesn't expect a politician to necessarily tell you what he really thinks and it would hardly be surprising for an academician to exploit the distance from reality that an "ivory tower" perspective affords so as to mold his perception of reality to coincide with his ideology. But Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi is neither. In fact, Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi is said to have been one of the architects of the disengagement plan. So when Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi asserts that "there is no military operation we can do today and won't be able to do in the future," he scares me. Because he is dead wrong. When one considers the range of post-retreat scenarios - both in terms of the composition and nature of the authority or authorities that may function in the Gaza Strip after the retreat - in almost all of them the Palestinians and their supporters can manipulate the situation so that Israel's military options, even under conditions of an ongoing war of attrition, will be radically limited.

If Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi really believes that "there is no military operation we can do today and won't be able to do in the future," that means that the people behind the disengagement plan have plunged the Jewish State into this radical move without even thinking through how to properly prepare for the morning after the retreat. On the other hand, Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi knows that the assertion that "there is no military operation we can do today and won't be able to do in the future," is baloney but says it anyway it means that a key military official involved in program has confused himself for a politician.

Which is worse? Either way, we have policy and planning driven by a patently false assumption. And that's a sure formula for disaster. Because if when reality strikes we aren't prepared for it the costs can be devastating. And that reality may strike a lot sooner than most think. At the same briefing Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi warned that Israel may have no choice but to use massive force to suppress Palestinian fire during the retreat. Force that could cause considerable "collateral damage" to the Palestinian civilian population.

Brigadier General (Res.) Eival Giladi gave this warning in the hopes that such threats would serve to deter Palestinian attacks. But, paradoxically, considerable "collateral damage" to the Palestinian civilian population could ultimately serve long range Palestinian interests by stripping Israel of any positive PR gain from retreating and also expediting foreign intervention and involvement that would restrain Israel and even possibly supplant Israel's claim to control of the "security envelope" of the Gaza Strip. With less than two months left before the retreat is slated to begin it is far from clear that the people behind this disengagement "experiment" have made a serious effort to prepare a "Plan B" should the "experiment" fail. In the absence of such a plan, I fear we will pay an even heavier price for this fiasco in the making.

Bibi's Choice

June 30,  2005

If Treasury Minister Binyamin Netanyahu opts to continue sitting on the sidelines as his colleagues struggle to stop the disengagement it won't be because he thinks it's a good plan. In point of fact, when Mr. Netanyahu explains the terrible consequences of retreat from Gaza it is with the very same passion and fervor that he defends his economic policy. But, unfortunately, the argument with many of the Likud ministers -  including Netanyahu - over possibly the most important decision faced by an Israeli government in this generation has never been the efficacy of the plan. Instead the critical and defining issue has been the personal career consequences for these Likud politicians if they dare to express their opposition to the retreat plan in critical votes rather than just comments to reporters.

Truth be told, if personal career rather than national interest is the
issue, Binyamin Netanyahu might be right to sit this one out. When primaries are held in the Likud after the retreat, Uzi Landau can certainly be expected to draw away votes from angry Likudniks in the first round.  But if the choice is between Netanyahu and Sharon in the second round, the desire to punish Sharon for initiating the retreat would far outweigh the desire to put Netanyahu in his place. Should Netanyahu lead the Likud ticket it is highly unlikely that Landau and other retreat opponents - with an eye on present and future policy challenges rather than past failures - would bolt the party. And while some Likud voters, angry and frustrated that the party aided and abetted the theft of their mandate in the last election when Sharon applied his overwhelming victory gained by opposing retreat in order to retreat, can be expected to support National Union and other national camp parties in the elections, it is reasonable to expect that a Likud headed by Netanyahu would win the largest number of seats of any party associated with the national camp and, in turn, form the next government.  And that's even if the elections are held in the midst of a Palestinian war of attrition that
exploits the retreat to the fullest. Not only that.  If Netanyahu takes an active role against retreat Sharon may send him packing. And if for some reason the Likud primaries are held only next year the standing of MK Netanyahu might be considerably lower than that of minister Netanyahu  The treasury minister who replaces him would grab the credit for any positive economic development and try to blame Netanyahu for any bad news.

But there is a reason Netanyahu should lead the opposition to retreat:  he knows that retreat is a disastrous mistake. And at this stage of the game he may be the only national leader who has a fighting chance to build a last-minute coalition to stop the madness.  That's build.  Not walk into a ready-made coalition. Should Netanyahu risk his shot at being prime minister when he can't even be certain that the retreat can be stopped?

Binyamin Netanyahu readily put his life on the line for the Jewish State when he served in an elite IDF unit.  Is his political life any dearer?

The Deadly Clichés

July 7, 2005

With implementation of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan slated for implementation only weeks away, retreat supporters continue to rely on clichés to justify possibly the most reckless move the Jewish State has undertaken since it was created over half a century ago. Disengagement has been justified as an "experiment" and its detractors accused of "not offering a new alternative". But the Gaza Strip is not a test tube rack and the absence of a new alternative to retreat doesn't add to the credibility of the retreat option.

Retreat supporters who argue that it is an "experiment" implicitly assume reversibility at an acceptable cost,  I shudder to think of the costs Israel would bear in a war if attrition followed by retaking of Gaza - and that's assuming that the array of international interests at play after Israel  retreats would permit such a move. But reversibility is only one issue.  Retreat isn't comparable to a simple junior high school chemistry lab "experiment".   Not only is the "success" of the experiment a matter of dispute, the policy recommendations that result from the outcome of the "experiment" can very well be predetermined.

Palestinians increase terror activity the retreat?  Retreat proponents could blame Israel for not being forthcoming with additional concessions after the retreat, etc.  The problem isn't retreating, they will argue, it's not retreating enough.

And what of the absence of a new "alternative"? There are countless patients in the world with various non-fatal ailments with no cure in sight.  In the absence of a new "alternative" should those patients embrace Dr. Kervorkian's "permanent cure" or keep searching?

Autonomy within Israel's envelope may not sound as novel as retreat, but with the dire consequences of retreat - creation of a fledgling terror state on the Mediterranean - becoming clearer with every passing day, it's the only viable option on the table.
Post retreat issues that cannot be ignored

               

Israeli Police Commissioner and IDF COS fail under pressure

July 22,  2005

The test of leaders is how they perform under pressure.  Unfortunately, Israel's new Police Commissioner Moshe Karadi and new Chief of Staff  Lt. Gen. Dan Haluz appear to have dropped the ball this week as pressure rose from anti-retreat protests. Karadi forfeited his credibility in the transparent games he played in his discussions with the leaders of the disengagement protesters.  He may have thought he was a sharp player as he suddenly pulled his "ace" - claims of information about dangerous situations - well into these discussions.

While it may be possible for Karadi to make amends for stupid police moves on the ground (for example confiscating the licenses of bus drivers to prevent people from reaching an anti-disengagement rally in Netivot), it will be considerably harder for him to reestablish his credibility. Haluz has allowed the IDF to get involved in suppressing protest within the Green Line - a serious confusion in role for an army in a democratic society.  He has also panicked in his every growing threats against soldiers who prefer to be punished rather than participate in the police action against Israeli settlers.

Refusal to carry out orders is certainly a complicated and sensitive issue -in particular since other soldiers serve defending settlements that they themselves oppose. But there is an important and significant factor in this case: none other than Prime Minister Ariel Sharon swears that it is time bound.  "There will be no second disengagement", Sharon swears. The IDF's justice system provides for a series of punishments against soldiers who refuse to carry out an order.  And if Haluz feels it necessary for these soldiers to serve time in military jail and the justice system backs him on it then this is a price they will have to pay for their stand. But that's military prison time - not being barred from continuing service in combat units and not being expelled from the special hesder torah study/military service program.

The IDF got sucked into a temporary police role.  Haluz can ill afford to ignore that tomorrow the IDF faces Israel enemies, rather than Israelis citizens.  The national can ill afford the luxury of permanently disposing of some of its most motivated combat fighters.