Peace Index
By Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann

[IMRA: A poll of a representative sample of 515 adult Israelis (including Israeli Arabs) carried out on the evening of 7 June by Dialog for Haaretz: Do you support convergence?  [AL: aka "Consolidation" aka withdrawal from most of the West Bank] Support 37% Oppose 56% Don't know 7% ]

Prime Minister Olmert's visit to Washington is defined as a success by a clear majority of the Jewish public. As for the basic political position he presented regarding the immediate need for permanent borders, it appears he also has considerable public support at this time. There is a broad consensus among the Jewish public that it is very important for Israel to have permanent borders, and that Israel has a moral right to decide on such borders even without coordination with the Palestinians. At the same time, there is an awareness of the limitations of power: the majority does not believe Israel has the ability to set its borders unilaterally without the support of the United States and the international community. The public is, in fact, evenly divided between supporters and opponents of the convergence plan, which includes an extensive evacuation of Jewish settlements and settlers from the West Bank. Nevertheless, a large majority believes that if the plan is adopted, Israel has the ability to carry it out, along with such a far-reaching dismantlement. The public's positions on the issue of the permanent borders, however and with what tradeoff they are attained, are apparently dictated by the desire to strengthen Israel's character as a Jewish state in the demographic sense. Thus, regarding the route the permanent borders will take, if the choice is between more territory or less Palestinian population, there is a clear preference that less Wes tBank land be annexed if this means fewer Palestinian residents in Israel. As for exchanges of territory, even though the majority does not ascribe much importance to the question of whether Israel should territorially compensate the Palestinians in return for West Bank lands that it includes in its borders, if territorial exchanges are to be carried out the public unequivocally prefers ceding the Arab-populated Triangle to giving up unpopulated areas of the Negev. In a similar spirit, there is broad public support for the Supreme Court's ruling that Israel does not have to grant citizenship to Palestinians who have married Israeli Arabs. Those are the main findings of the Peace Index survey that was carried out from Monday to Wednesday, 29-31 May. Today a majority of 58% of the Jewish public (mostly voters for Kadima, Labor, Meretz, and the Pensioners) view Prime Minister Olmert's visit to Washington as successful or very successful, 25% as unsuccessful, and 17.5% do not know. An even larger majority-75.5%-think, similar to the stance Olmert presented in Washington, that it is very important for Israel to have permanent borders. The recognition of that need is especially strong among Meretz (94%) and Labor (88%) voters; after them come voters for the Pensioners (70%), Kadima (68%), and Yisrael Beiteinu (60%). The support in Likud is lower, but still a majority supports the idea (50% in favor, 25% opposed, and the rest with no opinion). Only in the National Religious Party/National Union is there a majority of opponents (58%). How to arrive at these permanent borders is a more controversial question, since the convergence plan as presented by Olmert includes an extensive settlement evacuation. Here 47% indeed favor the plan, but 44% oppose it-a parity that did not exist regarding Sharon's disengagement plan even when support for it was at its lowest. However, support for the plan by voting is similar though not identical to the pattern of support for permanent borders. Support for the plan with its extensive dismantlement is headed by Meretz (94%) voters, followed by Labor (78%), Pensioners (73%), and Kadima (63%). Opponents have a majority among voters for Torah Judaism (92%), Yisrael Beiteinu (68%), and Shas (67%), and also among Likud voters (64.5%). At the same time, apparently inspired by the effective implementation of the disengagement plan, 67% believe that, despite the difficult experiences of the Gaza Strip evacuation and the Amona incident, Israel is capable of carrying out the plan if it decides to, even though a more extensive evacuation is involved (26% think it cannot succeed at this task and the rest have no opinion). Evidently, there is a close connection between support and feasibility assessment. Among the supporters, 89% view the plan as feasible, but only 9% of opponents see it that way. One can argue, of course, that the influence flows in the opposite direction, with feasibility assessment determining support or opposition-and in fact a connection emerges in that direction as well: among those viewing the convergence, including a widespread evacuation, as infeasible, 75% oppose it and only 16% support it.

A large majority of 70% support a position similar to the one Olmert presented-that Israel has the moral right to unilaterally decide its permanent borders. Especially interesting is that this view has wide support even among voters for the right-wing parties, whose level of support for the idea of permanent borders and, of course, for the convergence plan is lower: 90% of Likud voters affirm this moral right, 79% of Kadima voters, 67% of voters for Torah Judaism, National Religious Party/National Union, and Yisrael Beiteinu, and 60% of Labor voters. Among Meretz and Pensioners voters there is disagreement and more or less parity between those who uphold this right and those who deny it. However, unlike the high assessment of Israel's ability to carry out the convergence plan, on the issue of unilaterally setting the permanent borders there is wide public recognition of the limitations of power. Only 39% think Israel will be able to determine the borders unilaterally if this does not gain international and American support, whereas the majority (55%) says it cannot do so without such support. On that point a majority of voters for all the parties agree, with the exception of Shas.

Along with the prevailing recognition that Israel has a moral right to decide its permanent borders without consulting the Palestinians, many feel that even though this would entail annexing territories that belong to the Palestinians, it is not important that Israel should compensate them with lands of the same size within Israel. That is the view of 51% of the Jewish public, compared to 40% who think the Palestinians deserve such compensation. If, however, such a compensation is decided, a high rate-46%-favor giving territory from the Triangle, including Umm al-Fahm and other villages that are populated by Israeli Arabs, and only 15% prefer ceding unpopulated areas of the Western Negev. The rest do not know or oppose any exchanges of territory that would transfer parts of Israel to the Palestinians. Note that even among Meretz voters, for whom support for transferring empty lands-29%-is highest among all the parties, a higher rate favors giving up the Triangle-35%. The desire to increase the Jewish majority's demographic advantage in the state of Israel also emerges from the responses to two other questions. One asks what is preferable-that the permanent borders should preserve as much of the Land of Israel as possible for Jewish sovereignty, or that the Palestinian population remaining under Israeli sovereignty be reduced as much as possible even at the price of relinquishing territory. The Jewish public shows a clear preference-59%-for retaining as few Palestinians as possible even if it entails giving up territory, with one one-fourth opting for annexing more land even if that means increasing the Palestinian population that will live in Israel. A further manifestation of the strong desire to maintain a Jewish demographic majority is the Jewish public's sweeping support-70%-for the Supreme Court decision, albeit passed by a small majority, that legally the state of Israel does not have to grant citizenship to Palestinians who have married Israeli Arabs even if this means the couple cannot live together permanently in Israel or enjoy the rights of citizens. Only among Meretz voters does a minority view this decision as just, and Pensioners voters are split on the question. For the rest of the parties, a clear majority of the voters views this Supreme Court decision as right.

Indexes: General Oslo: 38.2; Jews: 33.2. General Negotiations: 51.1; Jews: 46.9. The Peace Index Project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution of Tel Aviv University, headed by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann. The telephone interviews were carried out by the B. I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv University on 29-31 May 2006, and included 593 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel (including the territories and the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is about 4.5% in each direction. For the findings of the survey, see: www.tau.ac.il/peace

The Basis of the U.S.-Israel Alliance. An Israeli Response to the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault

By Dore Gold, Institute for Contemporary Affairs (Dr. Dore Gold, who served as Israel's ambassador to the United Nations in 1997-1999, heads the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.)


On December 27, 1962, President John F. Kennedy told Israeli Foreign  Minister Golda Meir: "The United States has a special relationship with  Israel in the Middle East really comparable only to what it has with Britain  over a wide range of world affairs." The U.S. and Israel had a joint strategic interest in defeating aggressors  in the Middle East seeking to disrupt the status quo, especially if they had  Moscow's backing. In 1970 when Syria invaded Jordan, given the huge U.S.  military commitment in Southeast Asia at the time, it was only the  mobilization of Israeli strength that provided the external backing needed  to support the embattled regime of King Hussein. That same year, Israeli  Phantoms downed Soviet-piloted MiG fighters over the Suez Canal, proving the  ineffectiveness of the military umbrella Moscow provided its Middle Eastern  clients.

In 1981, Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, severely reducing Iraqi military strength. Ten years later, after a U.S.-led coalition had to liberate Kuwait following Iraq's occupation of that oil-producing mini-state, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney in October 1991 thanked Israel for its "bold and dramatic action" a decade earlier. In the 1980s, several memoranda of understanding between the U.S. and Israel on strategic cooperation were followed by regular joint military exercises, where U.S. forces were given access to Israel's own combat techniques and vice versa. The U.S. Marine Corps and special operations forces have particularly benefited from these ties, though much of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship is classified. Saudi Arabia has tried to tilt U.S. policy using a vast array of powerful PR firms, former diplomats, and well-connected officials, with the result being that America is still overly dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Given the ultimate destination of those petrodollars in recent years (the propagation of Islamic extremism and terrorism), a serious investigation of those lobbying efforts appears to be far more appropriate than focusing on relations between the U.S. and Israel.


A Special Relationship Spanning Decades

It was mid-morning on December 27, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy hosted the Foreign Minister of Israel, Golda Meir, in Palm Beach, Florida, for a heart-to-heart review of U.S.-Israel relations. Kennedy's language was unprecedented. In the secret memorandum drafted by the attending representative of the Department of State, Kennedy told his Israeli guest: "The United States has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East really comparable only to what it has with Britain over a wide range of world affairs ". According to a new paper prepared by two of America's top political scientists, Professor John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago and Professor Stephen Walt from the Kennedy School at Harvard University, "neither strategic nor moral arguments can account for America's support for Israel." The explanation for U.S. backing of Israel, according to these academics, is the "unmatched power of the Israel lobby."2 Yet their analysis is not grounded in any careful investigation of declassified U.S. documents from the Departments of State or Defense. What led Kennedy in 1962 to declare that the U.S.-Israel relationship was even comparable to America's alliance with the British? Since the early 1950s, the U.S. defense establishment has understood Israel's potential importance to the Western Alliance. Thus, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, assessed in 1952 that only Britain, Turkey, and Israel could help the U.S. with their air forces in the event of a Soviet attack in the Middle East.3 But against whatever Israel could tangibly offer the U.S., there was always a need to politically juggle America's ties with Israel and its efforts to create strategic relations with the Arab states. The first limited U.S. arms supply to Israel preceded Kennedy. During the Eisenhower years, when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' plans for a Baghdad Pact collapsed with the 1958 overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, the U.S. began to upgrade its defense ties with Israel. Kennedy started his presidency trying to build on a new relationship with Egypt's Nasser. But by 1962, Nasser intervened with large forces in Yemen, bombed Saudi border towns, and threatened to expand into the oil-producing areas of the Persian Gulf.


Israeli Actions That Served U.S. Interests

The U.S. and Israel had a joint strategic interest in defeating aggressors  in the Middle East seeking to disrupt the status quo, especially if they had  Moscow's backing. This became the essence of the U.S.-Israel alliance in the Middle East. It would repeat itself in 1970 when Syria invaded Jordan. Given the huge U.S. military commitment in Southeast Asia at the time, it was only the mobilization of Israeli strength that provided the external backing needed to support the embattled regime of King Hussein. In 1981, Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, severely reducing Iraqi military strength. Ten years later, after a U.S.-led coalition had to liberate Kuwait following Iraq's occupation of that oil-producing mini-state, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney thanked Israel for its "bold and dramatic action" a decade earlier. Indeed, Cheney would add in an October 1991 address: "strategic cooperation with Israel remains a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy." During those years, Israel became one of the main forces obstructing the spread of Soviet military power in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 1970 Israeli Phantoms downed Soviet-piloted MiG fighters over the Suez Canal, proving the ineffectiveness of the military umbrella Moscow provided its Middle Eastern clients in exchange for Soviet basing arrangements. When in the 1980s the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron made the Syrian port of Tartus its main submarine base, Israel offered Haifa to the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which had already begun to house U.S. ships in 1977. U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements in the 1980s over arms deployments in Central Europe increased the importance of NATO's flanks - including its southern flank - in the overall balance of power between the superpowers. This expanding cooperation was made concrete in the 1980s by several memoranda of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Israel on strategic cooperation, signed in 1981 and 1983. According to the Congressional Research Service, the strategic cooperation agreements were followed by regular joint military exercises, where U.S. forces were given access to Israel's own combat techniques and vice versa. The U.S. Marine Corps and special operations forces have particularly benefited from these ties. The U.S. European Command took a particular interest in Israeli combat helicopter training ranges. By 1992, the number of U.S. Navy ship visits to Haifa had reached 50 per year. Admiral Carl Trost, the former Chief of Naval Operations, commented that with the end of the Cold War and the shifting American interest in power projection to the Middle East, the Sixth Fleet's need for facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean had actually increased.

Do U.S. and Israeli interests diverge sometimes? Like any two countries, such differences can be expected. During the Cold War, Israel needed U.S. security ties in order to increase its own capabilities to deal with hostile Arab states. But Israel did not seek to become a target of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it signed an MOU with the U.S. in 1981 which singled out the USSR as a joint adversary of both countries. The MOU underscored that "the parties recognize the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region."4 In the 2003 Iraq War, most Israeli military leaders identified Iran as the greater threat to the Middle East at the time. Nonetheless, Israel certainly did not oppose the efforts of the U.S.-led coalition to topple Saddam Hussein. One complaint about the U.S.-Israel defense relationship has been the constraints Israel has put on it as a result of Israel's firm commitment to its doctrine of self-reliance. As Carl Ford, the Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Bush (41) administration, confided to a Senate Caucus in October 1991: "Another limitation, of course, is the longstanding view on the part of Israel, one which I think most of us share the viewpoint on...that not one ounce of American blood should be spilled in the defense of Israel." He suggested that changes needed to be introduced to make "our operations and interactions with Israel the same as they are with Great Britain and Germany." This comment was significant since detractors of the U.S.-Israel relationship like to insinuate that Israel seeks to get America to fight its wars for it. The truth is completely the opposite: while U.S. forces have been stationed on the soil of Germany, South Korea, or Japan to provide for the defense of those countries in the event of an attack, Israel has always insisted on defending itself by itself. If Israel today seeks "defensible borders," this is because it wants to deploy the Israel Defense Forces and not the U.S. Army in the strategically sensitive Jordan Valley.


Much of the Relationship Is Classified

There are other issues affecting the public discourse on U.S.-Israel defense ties. Much of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship is classified, particularly in the area of intelligence sharing. There are two direct consequences from this situation. First, most aspects of U.S.-Israel defense ties are decided on the basis of the professional security considerations of those involved. Lobbying efforts in Congress cannot force a U.S. security agency to work with Israel. Second, because many elements of the relationship are kept secret, it is difficult for academics, commentators, and pundits to provide a thorough net assessment of the true value of U.S.-Israel ties. Thus, Israel is left working shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S., and finds itself presented by outside commentators as a worthless ally whose status is only sustained by a domestic lobby. Nonetheless, what has come out about the U.S.-Israel security relationship certainly makes the recent analysis of Professors Walt and Mearsheimer extremely suspect.


Ask About the Saudi Lobby and U.S. Dependence on Middle East Oil

Does Israel have supporters in the U.S. that back a strong relationship between the two countries? Clearly, networks of such support exist, as they do for U.S. ties with Britain, Greece, Turkey, and India. There are also states like Saudi Arabia that have tried to tilt U.S. policy using a vast array of powerful PR firms, former diplomats, and well-connected officials. The results of those efforts have America still overly dependent on Middle Eastern oil with few energy alternatives. Given the ultimate destination of those petrodollars in recent years (the global propagation of Islamic extremism and terrorism), a serious investigation of those lobbying efforts appears to be far more appropriate than focusing on relations between the U.S. and Israel.



Hamas: Ideological commitment to radical Islam & constraints of Palestinian political reality

Ideological commitment to radical Islam vis-à-vis the constraints of Palestinian political reality: faced with concerns voiced by global jihad elements that Hamas might change its ways, spokesmen for the Hamas movement clarify that it does not intend to change its fundamental positions. They particularly stress the continuation of terrorism (the "resistance" and jihad) and non-recognition of Israel. Khaled Mash'al, head of the Hamas Political Bureau, in response to Al-Zawahiri: there can be no criticizing Hamas since its policy is based on the "resistance" (i.e., terrorism) and it refuses to yield to external pressures exerted upon the movement (i.e., the demands of the international community). Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's deputy, calls upon Hamas to adhere to the rule of Islamic religious law, oppose the "capitulation agreements" signed by the Palestinian Authority (i.e., the Oslo Accords), and continue the jihad (holy war) against "the Crusader-Zionist foe".

Overview

Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden's deputy, addressed Hamas in an audio tape and a video tape published in early March. Al-Zawahiri emphasized to Hamas a series of basic principles in the spirit of radical Islam, which, as he claimed, ought to guide Hamas on the Palestinian scene. In addition, spokesmen for the Chechen separatists issued sharp criticism of the Hamas movement against the backdrop of the visit of its delegation to Moscow. Al-Zawahiri's call and the Chechen separatists' criticism indeed reflect a concern prevalent among global jihad elements lest Hamas, having risen to power, embrace a pragmatic policy and abandon its basic principles. Hamas spokesmen, on their part, made it clear once again that the movement's entry into politics has as its goal the promotion of the Palestinian people's interests. They further stated that Hamas would not change its policy, particularly on such issues as the non-recognition of Israel , non-recognition of agreements signed with it, and the continuation of the armed struggle ("resistance" and jihad). These expressions of concern, and the response given by Hamas, clearly demonstrate the dilemmas faced by Hamas in the wake of its victory in the Legislative Council elections. They reflect the inherent tension between Hamas' ideological fundamental positions as a radical Islamic jihadist movement and the constraints of the Palestinian political reality, at times necessitating the movement to muffle its radical ideological messages (without changing its fundamental positions) and find practical solutions to the problems at hand.

Ayman al-Zawahiri warns Hamas against abandoning the principles of radical Islam and the way of jihad

On the night of March 4-5, 2006, an audio tape was published on the global jihad internet message boards on behalf of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden's deputy. A video version of the tape was broadcasted on Al-Jazeera Television (March 5). Al-Zawahiri's statements were recorded during the month of February under the title of "The [preferred] alternative is da'wah 1 and jihad". The tape, in which Al-Zawahiri calls Muslims to jihad (holy war) against the corrupted Arab regimes and Western countries, also includes an address on his behalf to the Hamas movement. In the tapes, Al-Zawahiri emphasized to Hamas a series of basic principles in the spirit of radical Islam, which, as he claimed, ought to guide Hamas on the Palestinian scene: attaining power is a means to instate the rule of Islamic religious law on earth rather than a goal unto itself; no one has a right to give up one grain of the territory of Palestine, for it is an Islamic land occupied by infidels; Palestine will not be liberated through elections but rather by jihad for the sake of Allah; jihad for the liberation of Palestine is a personal duty of every Muslim and not just of the Palestinians; participating in the Legislative Council alongside secular representatives who "sold" Palestine is contrary to the values of Islam; the agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel ("the capitulation agreements"), which are contrary to Islamic religious law, must not be upheld.

Senior Hamas spokesmen were quick to respond to the above statements by rejecting them, in fact, claiming that in practice, Hamas did not change its basic principles: Khaled Mash'al, head of the Hamas political bureau, stated that there can be no criticizing of Hamas, since its policy is based on the "resistance" (i.e., terrorism). He added apologetically that every movement must deal with politics (which, as may be inferred, has negative image), but that Hamas was doing it out of "self-respect" and "refusal to yield to external pressures" (Dunya al-Watan, March 5). Osama Hamdan, a Hamas representative in Lebanon, declared that the Hamas movement had participated in the elections to effect a change in Palestinian politics that would serve the "resistance and jihad" , while refusing to recognize the "Zionist entity" (Al-Jazeera Television, March 5). Mahmoud al-Zahar, Hamas' candidate for Foreign Minister in the new government, stressed that Hamas had no intentions of abandoning the way of "resistance" (i.e., terrorism) but rather to strengthen it (Al-Jazeera, March 5).

Criticism by the Chechen separatists and the Hamas' response

The tension between the fundamental ideological positions and the constraints of political reality was reflected in the visit of the Hamas delegation in Russia . The Hamas movement's long-standing empathy with the Chechen separatists and the terrorism they use against Russia did not stop it from quickly responding positively to President Putin's invitation to visit Moscow . 2 In the wake of the visit (March 3-4), and against the backdrop of statements made by the Hamas delegation during it, the Hamas was criticized by the Chechen separatists, who had formerly enjoyed the Hamas' ideological support and expressions of sympathy. Ahmed Zakayev, a senior representative of the Chechen separatists, accused Hamas of putting the Russian government's interests ahead of the interests of religious solidarity with the Muslims in Chechnya . He called upon Khaled Mash'al and Hamas not to alienate themselves from their Chechen brothers, since " Palestine , Chechnya , Iraq , Afghanistan [are] all Muslim lands", whose peoples fight against the "infidel foe". Ahmed Zakayev called upon Hamas to implement the Islamic religious law to the letter, oppose any past agreements signed by "the traitors" (i.e., the Palestinian Authority and the PLO), and continue jihad to "return the lands of Islam to the faith of Islam". 3 Movledi Odogov, another spokesman for the Chechen separatists, also lashed out against Hamas, stating that the delegation about to visit Russia would shake the hands of "the murderers of the Muslims in Chechnya ", who had "committed appalling crimes". He added that Hamas would be naive to expect that Russia , under Putin's leadership, would recognize Hamas and become a political partner of the Palestinians. 4Isma'il Abd al-Latif Muhammad al-Ashqar, a member of the Hamas faction in the Legislative Council, has responded to this criticism by saying that the Hamas movement well understands the criticism of the "Chechen brothers". Hamas is well aware of the Chechens' pain and distress and demands freedom to the Muslim Chechen people; yet at the same time Hamas needs the support of a power such as Russia to stand on the side of the Palestinian people. Isma'il al-Ashqar added that Hamas was always putting the interests of the Palestinian people ahead of any other interest (Islam Online, March 6). Thus, in fact, he presented a clear example of the dilemma faced by Hamas: the contradiction between an Islamic ideology of global reach and particular Palestinian interests. In the past, Hamas attempted to theoretically bridge this contradiction in its charter (1988), but now, having won the Legislative Council elections, it has resurfaced once again.

1 Da'wah -spreading Islam through preaching, propaganda, and religious-political indoctrination carried out in an educational-cultural or any other method. Da'wah is geared towards changing the belief systems and values of human beings (including moderate Muslims), transforming them into Muslim believers. The Hamas movement and radical Islamic movements worldwide place significant emphasis on the da'wah institutions (schools, mosques, charity associations, and various publications) as a means to spread the ideas of radical Islam.

2 On Hamas' empathy with the Chechens, see Information Bulletin dated September 2004 on the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center website.

3 From the website of Sheikh Hamed al-Ali, which also serves as a mouthpiece for the Chechen separatists (March 5, 2006). Sheikh Hamed Bin Abdallah Ahmed al-Ali is an extremist scholar on Islamic religious law, and a lecturer on Islamic culture in Kuwait . He writes and teaches about Islamic law. He had previously justified suicide bombing attacks in a religious ruling published on the Hamas website. By Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies.