Turkey's fear of Iran's influence. U.S. and Iran conferring on Iraq. 

By Sue Lerner

THE DAILY STAR (Lebanon)  "Turkey's emerging fear: Iranian influence"

Commentary by Iason Athanasiadis "specialist in Middle East politics who often visits Iran"

QUOTES FROM TEXT: "Turkish Foreign Minister feared the spread of Iranian influence from southern Iraq to his own country",,, "Ankara recently announced its willingness to act as an intermediary with Iran over ... nuclear power"... "growing rapprochement between the US and Turkey"...Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul recently confessed that he feared the spread of Iranian influence from southern Iraq to his own country. Although Gul later denied having made this statement, his comment was a valuable insight into Turkey's true concerns over political developments on its southern flank. There, the Bush administration has subjected three countries to concerted political pressure in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. After five years of such pressure, Iran and Syria are turning into increasingly isolated international pariahs. The same policy, when applied by Washington to Iraq, culminated in the country's invasion and the growing fragmentation of its society along sectarian lines. Both Iran and Syria include similar ethnic mosaics, so the prospect of persistent instability could prompt them to dangerously realign along racial, tribal or sectarian fronts. Turkey's other big concern is that the Bush administration's clumsy redrawing of the regional geopolitical map has brought about a potentially unstoppable rise in Iranian influence. And while Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has accepted his country's secularism, he also heads one of the more overtly Muslim governments in the history of the Turkish republic.  Recently, a group of retired generals and ambassadors diagnosed the development of "theocratic nationalism" in Iran and warned of the danger it posed to Turkey. The incoming Turkish ambassador to Iran, Gurcan Turkoglu, is Gul's top foreign policy adviser. Ankara recently announced its willingness to act as an intermediary with Tehran for a resolution to the dispute over its nuclear program. Ankara's re-engagement in the region is worrying Israel (whose only openly Muslim ally until now was Turkey), even as the Turks offer Washington an additional channel through which to promote its Middle East initiatives and exert pressure. Turkish concerns - shared by the United States - are fuelling a growing rapprochement between the U.S. and Turkey. And in the event diplomacy fails, Turkey is one of Washington's more reliable allies in Iran's vicinity that can help force the latter's hand....For the moment, the big policy issue facing Turkey is whether Iraq will descend into civil war. ...  the transformation of Iraq's most economically viable part into an Iranian zone of influence would turn Iran into a powerful regional actor threatening both Turkey and Israel...Turkey to refocus its foreign policy emphasis in Iraq away from....Turkmen community and toward more realistic options such as dealing with Iraq's powerful Shiite bloc.  ... .The Turkmen, realizing that Turkey's support is waning, have panicked. But ethnic symmetries may not be enough to entice Erdogan to throw the brunt of his diplomatic support behind the small group at a time whe Jaafari reportedly dangled the promise of expelling the 5,000 members of the Kurdish Workers' Party from Iraq, if they continued to mount cross-border attacks against Turkey. Furthermore, there is a natural alliance between Jaafari and Ankara over the disputed city of Kirkuk, from where a considerable number of Shiites and Turkmens are likely to be displaced in the event of a Kurdish takeover.

ARAB NEWS (Saudi) 25 Mar.'06:"Why Give Iran a Say on Iraq?"  Amir Taheri, QUOTES FROM TEXT: "Iran and the United States ... to begin talks on ...'measures to benefit the Iraqi people"..."Iraq likely to have a pluralist regime in which Shiites are a majority, Iran may no longer face ...Sunni Arab regimes determined to challenge it"..."emergence of a Shiite dominated democracy next door may well inspire a democratic revolution in Iran"..."may encourage Iran's defiance of the UN resolution".


FULL TEXT: Barring a last-minute hitch Iran and the United States are expected to begin talks on what they have both called "measures to benefit the Iraqi people." The euphemism is unlikely to deceive anyone. What Tehran and Washington are really interested in is to find out each other's true intentions in Iraq. There is no doubt that both Iran and the United States have benefited from the demise of the Baathist regime under Saddam Hussein. The US has eliminated an enemy that it had wounded but not killed in 1991, something that Machiavelli had warned against almost five centuries ago. With Iraq likely to have a pluralist regime in which Shiites are a majority, Iran may no longer face a coalition of Sunni Arab regimes determined to challenge it in the region. But while US and Iranian interests in Iraq converge up to a point, the two powers have diametrically opposite visions when it comes to the future of Iraq, indeed of the entire Middle East. The US wants a democratic and pro-West Iraq with a capitalist market-based economy, and open to the new globalization trends. In his better moments President George W. Bush has even spoken of turning Iraq into a model for the entire Arab world, indeed for all Muslim countries. And that, of course, is indirect competition with Iran that claims that its own system is the ideal one for all Muslims. Iran wants an Iraqi regime that adopts at least some aspects of Khomeinism if only to prove that the Islamic republic in Tehran is not a historic anomaly. The Tehran leadership is also concerned that the emergence of a Shiite-dominated democracy next door may well inspire a democratic revolution in Iran as well. With he center of Shiite theological authority clearly shifting to Najaf, Iran's rulers may risk losing the religious card they have played for the past 27 years. The crucial question in regional politics now is whether Iraq, and beyond it the Middle East, will be reshaped the way US wants it or remolded as Iran's Khomeinist leaders have dreamed of since 1979. It is against that background that it is important to know what Iran would actually bring to the table when, and if, the promised talks materialize. Iran has already scored a point simply by being invited by the US for talks.  Although Iran did nothing to oust Saddam Hussein, this invitation bestows on it a stature that only a liberating power would normally have. For example, at the end of World War II no one invited Switzerland or Poland, as neighbors of Germany, to discuss its future. Iran has scored yet another point by positioning itself as a power speaking for the Iraqi people. The leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic  Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Abdul-Aziz Hakim has helped Iran's maneuver by issuing a verbal "invitation" to enter the talks almost as a protector of the people of Iraq. The fact that Hakim and his party have been supported by Iran for more than a quarter of a century does not diminish the importance of that move. The Iranian strategy is clear from the outset. Foreign Minister Manuchehr  Mottaki has said that Iran's chief priority is to discuss the withdrawal of the US-led coalition forces from Iraq. Mottaki knows that the US and its allies are in Iraq under a United Nations' mandate that will run out in December. He also knows that that mandate cannot be renewed without the consent of the newly elected Iraqi Parliament and government. Finally, he also knows that President George W. Bush is under pressure from both Democrats and Republicans to bring the Iraqi episode to an end. So, when the Americans and their allies start to leave, as they are certain to do later this year, Iran would be able to pretend that it was its efforts that ended the "occupation". Iran, however, has more important ambitions in Iraq. Strategically, it sees post-Saddam Iraq as a corridor through which it can communicate with Syria and Lebanon that it considers as part of its broader glacis. In fact, once Tehran's influence is established in Iraq as it is in Syria and Lebanon, Iran would be able to project power in the Levant for the first time since the early 7th century when the Persian Empire under Khosrow Parviz drove the Byzantines out of Mesopotamia and what is now Syria. It is no accident that scholars in Tehran have just rediscovered the set of agreements that Iran had signed with the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.  Known as the Erzerum treaties, these documents give Iran a droit de regard (the right of oversight) over Iraq's principal Shiite centers of Najaf, Kerbala and Kazemayn (now a suburb of Baghdad). The agreements also enable Iran to take "appropriate action", a code word for military intervention, if it felt that its security, or the access of Iranian pilgrims to "holy places", was being threatened by the presence of foreign hostile forces in southern Iraq. If implemented those agreements could lead to the emergence of an Iranian administration in the "holy cities" and an Iranian veto on key aspects of Iraq's foreign policy. Iran has already used those agreements to persuade the new Iraqi government to sign an agreement under which more than 600,000 Iranian pilgrims would be able to visit Iraq each year with little control from the Iraqi authorities. The second set of documents that Tehran is now dusting up is known as the Algiers Accords, negotiated and signed in Algiers, Geneva, Tehran and Baghdad between 1975 and 1976. These give Iran and Iraq shared sovereignty over the Shatt Al-Arab estuary that constitutes Iraq's principal outlet to the open seas. The agreements, signed by Saddam Hussein as a tactical ploy to end Iranian support for the Kurds in the 1970s, would, if fully implemented, give Iran a chokehold on Iraq's foreign trade, including oil exports. Iran does not want the US to fail in Iraq. It wants the US to succeed in eliminating all possibility of a new Sunni-dominated regime being installed in Baghdad. But Iran wants the US to succeed at the highest possible cost, both in blood and treasure. It is a mystery why Washington wants to give Tehran a place at the high table in Iraq. It is certain that the Islamic republic will continue doing whatever it can to make life difficult for the US-led coalition. The supply of new and more lethal explosives, smuggled into Iraq from Iran, partly via Syria is unlikely to dry up. Nor is Tehran likely to end the training programs launched by its Lebanese Hezbollah clients for Iraqi militants. The decision to involve Iran in Iraqi affairs is likely to anger the United States regional allies who have never discounted the possibility of an Irano-American deal that might leave them in the lurch. The Arab states will also be concerned about the possibility of Iraq's Arab identity being diluted as a result of Iranian intervention. The US may have made this strange move because of the experiment in Afghanistan where talks with Iran did help speed up the defeat of the Taliban and the creation of a new regime in Kabul. But Iraq is not Afghanistan if only because it offers far more scope for Iranian mischief making. The invitation to Iraq is also likely to encourage Iran in its defiance of the United Nations on the nuclear issue. After all if Iran is treated as a major power in one domain it cannot be "bullied" as a weakling in another. Has the Bush administration made its first major mistake with regard to Iraq? It is too early to tell. But this decision may be even worse than a mistake; it may be unnecessary. And, as Talleyrand noted almost 200 years ago, in politics doing something that is not necessary is worse than making a mistake.

Not so sacred Saudi Arabia. Egyptian Press "freedom"

By Dr. Joseph Lerner

ARAB NEWS (Saudi) 12 Mar.'06: "Over 2,000 Overstayers Arrested "Samir Al-Saadi, Arab News. QUOTES FROM TEXT:  "Police busted up prostitution houses, illegal maid networks, forged ID document rackets, alcohol manufacturers and distributors, and illegal international call cabin operators."..."Some just waiting to be raided to get a free ride back home, others acknowledging that they have nowhere to run,,' he said.  Many undocumented migrants in this region are pilgrims that overstay their Haj visas."

EXCERPTS: JEDDAH, 12 March 2006 - In its largest pre-dawn raid so far this year, Jeddah security  ... arresting 2,327 undocumented migrants, most of whom appeared to be voluntarily turning themselves in for deportation....  Jeddah police chief Col. Misfer Al-Misahi led ... the operations, which involved cutting off electricity to 16 residential buildings that were crowded with overstayers. Landlords of these properties are being investigated. Police busted up prostitution houses, illegal maid networks, forged ID document rackets, alcohol manufacturers and distributors, and illegal international call cabin operators. Drugs were confiscated from a number of  homes; police said that they found large amounts of Captagon (the commercial name for a therapeutic amphetamine fenetylline) and hashish...."We have solved a number of crimes by matching fingerprints," said an official who did not want to be identified. In Jeddah's downtown ...  Arab News observed hundreds of presumed  overstayers turning themselves in as soon as the buses for arrested illegal aliens stopped. Arab News asked an officer at the scene if it is common to have overstayers  voluntarily turning themselves in for deportation. "Yes," he said, "they start turning themselves in. Some just waiting to be raided to get a free ride back home, others acknowledging that they have nowhere to run," he said. Many undocumented migrants in this region are pilgrims that overstay their Haj visas.

AL-AHRAM WEEKLY 9-15 Mar.'06:"Confrontation escalates": HEADING: "With the imprisonment of a second journalist in less than two weeks the showdown between government  and press is in danger of spinning out of control, writes Jailan Halawi". QUOTES FROM TEXT:  "Several unsuccessful attempts have already been made at issuing a draft law that satisfies all parties, Indeed, the Ministry of Justice is currently drafting a law and will consult with the syndicate over its provisions before submitting  it to the People's Assembly.   Yet according to the syndicate's council  the new law  'remains enigmatic'."..." why is it taking the government years to repeal a law that restricts freedom when, in serving its own interests, it passes many [laws] in a matter of days' "

EXCERPTS: A Criminal Court on Tuesday sentenced a journalist to one year in jail, fuelling the growing conflict between the press and the government. Journalist Amira Malsh was found guilty of libelling judge Atia Mohamed Awad in a story published in the independent weekly Al-Fagr in July. Malsh said information mentioned in the story was quoted from sources linked to a bribery case then under investigation by the state security prosecutor. Al-Fagr 's editor-in-chief, the well known writer Adel Hamouda, said he would contest the ruling which he described as "a new blow to journalists". Hamouda called on the Press Syndicate and all human rights organisations to support Malsh. The ruling is the second time in less than two weeks that a journalist has been imprisoned and ups the ante in the campaign by journalists to rescind the law that allows jail sentences for publication offences. On 23 February a Cairo court sentenced Abdel-Nasser El-Zuheiri, a journalist with the independent daily Al-Masri Al-Yom, to one year in jail. El-Zuheiri, along with two colleagues from the same paper, was also ordered to pay LE10,001 in compensation. The three journalists had been accused of libelling former minister of housing Mohamed Ibrahim Suleiman in a story that appeared in August 2004.  Last April each received one- year jail sentence but was subsequently granted a retrial since the earlier judgement had been passed in absentia. On 3 March, following discussions between the Chairman of the Press Syndicate Galal Aref, Suleiman, Minister of Information Anas El-Fiqi and head of the Supreme Press Council Safwat El-Sherif, Suleiman agreed to drop suits filed against 37 publications. Following the meeting Aref and Suleiman issued a joint statement in which Suleiman explained his decision to abandon the lawsuits had come in response to both the president's decision to do away with custodial sentences and appeals he had received from the Supreme Press Council. Suleiman noted he was satisfied with the court ruling in his favour and was not actively seeking the jailing of journalists.
.  .  .
Speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly Aref described the move as a reflection of the regime's conviction that jail sentences for publication offences are no longer relevant as Egypt moves towards reform and democracy. The compromise, he said, was "a sign that the government is seeking a way to end the crisis". Aref nonetheless stressed that the syndicate's goal was not only to suspend the sentence against El-Zuheiri but to press for the abolition of custodial sentences. Until that happens, he said, "the confrontation lingers".
.  .  .
Several unsuccessful attempts have already been made at issuing a draft law that satisfies all concerned parties. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice is currently drafting a law and will consult with the syndicate over its provisions before submitting it to the People's Assembly. Yet according to the syndicate's council the new law "remains enigmatic". In statements President Hosni Mubarak has said the law in question should be passed during the current parliamentary session, which ends in May.  Journalists, though, are skeptical: "why is it taking the government years to repeal a law that restricts freedom when, in serving its own interests, it passes many [laws] in a matter of days," noted one. One explanation for the delay is concern on the part of the Ministry of Justice over several provisions in the syndicate's own draft law. Yet though the ministry has informed the syndicate of such concerns it has yet to call for further consultations. Rumours have recently surfaced that the Ministry of Justice has already presented its own draft law to the Council of Ministers, without consulting or informing the syndicate, a move should it prove true will serve only to complicate the picture. But can the law be passed without the syndicate's consent? "Of course. They [the government] can do anything. Yet we will reject any law of which we have not approved and over which we have not been consulted," said Aref. The journalists' campaign, Aref explained, should not be viewed solely in terms of enshrining their right not to be jailed for what they write but within the framework of democratic reforms. "We cannot speak of liberty when there is such restraint on freedoms. We are not asking that journalists be above the law, or for a licence to slander, but we are calling for jail sentences to be replaced by fines. No one should be jailed for their views."
 

Excerpts: Iran-Syria pact against 'common threats'. Who makes policy in Arab countries? 16 June 2006. THE DAILY STAR (Lebanon) 16 June '06:"Iran and Syria sign pact against 'common threats' " Iran and Syria sign pact against 'common threats' ". Farhad Pouladi, AFP & AP

HEADING:"Military accord names Israel and United States". QUOTES FROM TEXT:"Iran and Syria ... agreement for military cooperation against 'common threats' ...by Israel and the United States".  "Iran is ready to sign a non-aggression pact with regional countries"

EXCERPTS:
TEHRAN: Defense ministers from close allies Iran and Syria on  15 June signed an agreement for military cooperation against what they called the "common threats" presented by Israel and the United States. ...consolidating their defense efforts and strengthening support for one another.... Syrian side has purchased some Iranian military equipment....  formation of a joint Supreme Defense Commission ... Washington has included Syria in its "axis of evil" that also comprises Iran and North Korea, citing these nations as "supporters of terrorism." ..., Turkmani dismissed the possibility of hosting an Iranian military base on Syrian soil. ...The Iranian defense minister said: "US threats are a kind of psychological operation. It is not new. With unity among the region's nations, these threats will not prevail." ..."We will continue both research and development and production of missiles as part of our current trend of activities," (Iranian defense minister) ... .Although the two refused to give specifics about the agreement for military cooperation, Najjar said Iran "considers Syria's security its own security, and we consider our defense capabilities to be those of Syria." ..."Iran is ready to sign a non-aggression pact with regional countries," Najjar said. Iran's Shahab-3 missiles have a range of 2,000 kilometers, capable of hitting Israel and US bases in the region. Israel and the United States have jointly developed the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system, which could intercept Iran's Shahab-3 missiles. ...

JORDAN TIMES 16-17 June '06 "Rule by militias, a chronic Arab problem" by Rhami G. Khouri. QUOTES FROM TEXT: "common habit of tying to dictate political policy through the use of gunmen on the streets". "What do we know ... about the political sentiments of the Fateh and Hamas gunmen ... noble concept ... Or power  and sharing the material spoils of incumbency?"

EXCERPTS: The events in Palestine Monday highlighted dramatically the reasons why representatives from a dozen research centres in the Arab world, Europe and the United States gathered in Amman this week to explore the issue of reforming Arab armed forces and security agencies. Hamas gunmen Monday fired rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank rockets at the Gaza headquarters of the Fateh-dominated Preventive Security Forces; in return, Fateh gunmen...burned the Palestinian parliament and Cabinet buildings in Ramallah. This spectacle of military forces taking to the street, shooting people and burning public offices they believe to be controlled by their rivals brings that society closer to the point where armed gangs and party militias effectively take over the political process....: Who holds power and makes policy in Arab countries, elected civilian authorities or gunmen on the street?...armed groups, private armies, neighbourhood gangs and party militias seem to be a growth industry throughout the Middle East. .  .  ..security sector reform is imperative if other reforms -  economic, political, social -  are to have a chance of succeeding in Arab lands. .  .  .In Palestine today, we also see the common habit of trying to dictate political policy through the use of gunmen on the streets...security is a legitimate and crucial task, and it is best performed by professional agencies working closely with elected civilian bodies, according to laws enforced by an independent judiciary.... Any goal that is seen to emanate from Western capitals, no matter how good or appropriate (e.g., democracy, human rights, free press), is likely to generate stiff resistance in Arab societies ... What do we know... about the political sentiments of the Fateh and Hamas
gunmen burning public buildings in Ramallah and Gaza? Are they fighting for a noble concept of an independent Palestine living in democracy, freedom and peace? Or are they more interested in holding on to power and sharing the material spoils of incumbency?


_________________________________________________________________

Excerpts: India-Iran togetherness. Arab failure to interact with Iran.26 March 2006


ARAB NEWS (Saudi) 26 Mar.'06:"India, Iran Emphasize Closer Ties "Nilofar  Suhrawardy, Arab News -
QUOTES FROM TEXT: "India-Iran relations ... called for strengthening bilateral cooperation, especially in the energy sector"..."A meeting of the India-Iran Joint Commission ... to discuss multi-faceted relations".."India which gets most of its oil from the Gulf ... has hundreds of thousands of its citizens working there"

EXCERPTS: NEW DELHI, 26 March 2006 - Sending a message that the India-Iran relations have not been affected by New Delhi's vote against Tehran's nuclear program, Prime Minister ...and visiting Iranian Vice President  ...yesterday called for strengthening bilateral cooperation, especially in the energy sector. "The two leaders emphasized the importance they attach to the civilizational ties  ... and the need for further strengthening bilateral cooperation,  particularly in the energy sector,"...A meeting of the India-Iran Joint Commission would be convened soon to discuss multi-faceted relations between the two countries. "They agreed on the need for an early meeting of the India-Iran Joint  Commission,"  .... Energy-hungry India is in negotiations with Iran for the supply of gas via a pipeline that would run through Pakistan, with a next round of talks scheduled for late April. India plans to initially draw 60 million cubic meters of gas from the pipeline and increase the quantity to 90 million cubic meters within two to three years. Despite initial opposition, US President George W. Bush said during a visit to India this month that he had no objections to New Delhi buying gas from a country that Washington accuses of supporting terrorism and attempting to make a nuclear bomb. Yesterday's meeting is the first high-profile talks between leaders of the two countries since India in February voted with 26 other nations to refer Iran to the UN Security Council over its nuclear program. The Gulf Cooperation Council hopes to sign soon a free trade agreement with  India, the head of the grouping said yesterday. "A free trade agreement with India will boost the volume of trade to $15 billion in coming years," GCC Secretary-General Abdulrahman Al-Attiyah said yesterday at a meeting of Gulf and Indian businessmen in the Omani capital.Trade between India, which gets most of its oil from the Gulf and has hundreds of thousands of its citizens working there, and the GCC was estimated at $12.8 billion last year. .  .  .

AL-AHRAM WEEKLY 23-29 Mar. '06    "The Arab exit"By Salama A Salama

QUOTES FROM TEXT: "[US-Iran] discussions will be confined to Iraq". "Arab failure to adopt an effective policy vis-à-vis Iraq is largely a result of Egypt's failure to engage positively with the Iranian regime"

EXCERPTS: No one had anticipated that the US would invite Iran to hold direct talks over the situation in Iraq. Nor had anyone expected that such an invitation would originate with the Shia political power that controls the coalition led by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the majority party in the elected Iraqi parliament. America insists discussions will be confined to Iraq and not include Tehran's nuclear ambitions...It is clear that regional balances of power are beginning to be redrawn.  Another is the emergence of Iran as a key player in Iraq. The obstacles in the way of forming a national unity government, which Washington insists is the only way to avoid civil war, serve only to underline Iranian influence since Tehran alone is capable of deciding Shia competition for the post of prime minister. The rise of Hamas in the Palestinian equation, and the assistance Iran provides to Hizbullah in Lebanon and its backing of Syria, also lend urgency to contain Iranian influence. Arab failure to adopt an effective policy vis-à-vis Iraq is largely a result of Egypt's failure to engage positively with the Iranian regime and coordinate positions over shared problems that impact on Arab and Egyptian interests, including Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Despite Tehran's attempts to normalise relations with Egypt, Egypt has preferred to direct its normalisation efforts towards Israel. If US-Iranian talks on Iraq prove to be even a limited success, then the Arabs will remain shut out of Iraq for a long time to come ... .



Excerpts: Moderation among Islamists in Jordan. Disbanding of militias

THE JORDAN TIMES 20 Mar. '06:Editorial:Invaluable opposition". QUOTE FROM TEXT: "a moderate, sensible, stabilising Islamist movement"..."defends pluralism and steers people away from extremism"

EXCERPTS: So, all the fears about Jordan's Islamic opposition radicalising and falling
into the orbit of this or that militant movement were misplaced. What a relief... our Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Action Front showed maturity, holding on to one's  ...identity. This region needs the invaluable input of a moderate, sensible, stabilising Islamic movement that can offer itself as an invaluable mediator, spread the true message of a tolerant and peaceful Islam which rejects any form of violence, proactively contribute to democratisation, defend pluralism and steer people away from extremism. We are now a little bit more hopeful that such a movement can indeed develop. Here. Against most expectations and amid mounting talk of a Hamas' longa manus reaching out for control of the Jordanian Islamic movement, internal elections in the IAF this past weekend and in the Muslim Brotherhood a few weeks ago rendered a mostly moderate and young leadership...hardliner hawks were seen as ... keeping a sort of self-imposed low profile... Who or what convinced them not to compete? What exactly happened ahead of these important elections and what factors interfered in the fielding of candidates remains anyone's guess, given the traditionally secretive attitude of the Islamic movement vis-à-vis its internal matters... the hawks didn't run  ... because they felt that the shura councils of both the Brotherhood and the IAF were inclined towards choosing a moderate leadership. In the Brotherhood's case, the ... outgoing overall leader Abdul Majeed Thneibat,  ... abandoned the race for ...his desire to see a younger generation of leaders at the helm of the movement...our congratulations ...to the mainstream Islamic movement ... for having yet again given the entire country an example of efficient and smart organisation, rigorous self-discipline, and respect for the rules of the game.

THE DAILY STAR (Lebanon) March 20, 2006. "Fatah to collect Palestinian arms in Lebanon's refugee camps". Agence France Presse (AFP). QUOTES FROM TEXT: "Fatah's ... Palestinian faction would round up weapons from [Lebanon's] refugee camps"..."380,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon"..." state re-establishing its authority on all Lebanese territory"

FULL TEXT: RASHIDIYEH, Lebanon: Fatah's chief in Lebanon said Sunday his Palestinian faction would round up weapons from refugee camps amid growing calls for militias in the country to be disbanded. "We have decided to collect all the weapons we possess, including individual arms, and put them in secure places (inside the camps), in accordance with the wishes of the inter-Lebanese dialogue conference," said Sultan Abu al-Aynayn. Leaders from across the political and religious spectrum have been meeting in Beirut to solve such contentious issues as the presence of armed Palestinians outside refugee camps. There are believed to be 380,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon, many of them in dire conditions in 12 refugee camps. Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri said Tuesday that participants in the inter-Lebanese talks supported disarming Palestinians outside the camps in six months and "the state re-establishing its authority on all Lebanese territory." Abu al-Aynayn also asserted the authority of the Palestine Liberation Organization - of which Fatah is the largest faction - as the only legitimate representative of Palestinians in Lebanon. The PLO does not include Palestinian Islamist groups such as Hamas, which trounced Fatah in January's elections, or pro-Syrian groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, which has beeninvolved in a number of shooting incidents outside Palestinian camps. The inter-Lebanese dialogue is expected to resume on March 22. - AFP

 

Turkey's fear of Iran's influence. U.S. and Iran conferring on Iraq.

THE DAILY STAR (Lebanon) 24 Mar.'06  "Turkey's emerging fear: Iranian influence"

Commentary by Iason Athanasiadis "specialist in Middle East politics who often visits Iran"

QUOTES FROM TEXT: "Turkish Foreign Minister feared the spread of Iranian influence from southern Iraq to his own country",,, "Ankara recently announced its willingness to act as an intermediary with Iran over ... nuclear power"... "growing rapprochement between the US and Turkey"...Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul recently confessed that he feared the spread of Iranian influence from southern Iraq to his own country. Although Gul later denied having made this statement, his comment was a valuable insight into Turkey's true concerns over political developments on its southern flank. There, the Bush administration has subjected three countries to concerted political pressure in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. After five years of such pressure, Iran and Syria are turning into increasingly isolated international pariahs. The same policy, when applied by Washington to Iraq, culminated in the country's invasion and the growing fragmentation of its society along sectarian lines. Both Iran and Syria include similar ethnic mosaics, so the prospect of persistent instability could prompt them to dangerously realign along racial, tribal or sectarian fronts. Turkey's other big concern is that the Bush administration's clumsy redrawing of the regional geopolitical map has brought about a potentially unstoppable rise in Iranian influence. And while Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has accepted his country's secularism, he also heads one of the more overtly Muslim governments in the history of the Turkish republic.  Recently, a group of retired generals and ambassadors diagnosed the development of "theocratic nationalism" in Iran and warned of the danger it posed to Turkey. The incoming Turkish ambassador to Iran, Gurcan Turkoglu, is Gul's top foreign policy adviser. Ankara recently announced its willingness to act as an intermediary with Tehran for a resolution to the dispute over its nuclear progra.. Ankara's re-engagement in the region is worrying Israel (whose only openly Muslim ally until now was Turkey), even as the Turks offer Washington an additional channel through which to promote its Middle East initiatives and exert pressure. Turkish concerns - shared by the United States - are fuelling a growing rapprochement between the U.S. and Turkey. And in the event diplomacy fails, Turkey is one of Washington's more reliable allies in Iran's vicinity that can help force the latter's hand....For the moment, the big policy issue facing Turkey is whether Iraq will descend into civil war. ...  the transformation of Iraq's most economically viable part into an Iranian zone of influence would turn Iran into a powerful regional actor threatening both Turkey and Israel...Turkey to refocus its foreign policy emphasis in Iraq away from....Turkmen community and toward more realistic options such as dealing with Iraq's powerful Shiite bloc.  ... .The Turkmen, realizing that Turkey's support is waning, have panicked. But ethnic symmetries may not be enough to entice Erdogan to throw the brunt of his diplomatic support behind the small group at a time whe Jaafari reportedly dangled the promise of expelling the 5,000 members of the Kurdish Workers' Party from Iraq, if they continued to mount cross-border attacks against Turkey. Furthermore, there is a natural alliance between Jaafari and Ankara over the disputed city of Kirkuk, from where a considerable number of Shiites and Turkmens are likely to be displaced in the event of a Kurdish takeover.

ARAB NEWS (Saudi) 25 Mar.'06:"Why Give Iran a Say on Iraq?"  Amir Taheri, QUOTES FROM TEXT: "Iran and the United States ... to begin talks on ...'measures to benefit the Iraqi people"..."Iraq likely to have a pluralist regime in which Shiites are a majority, Iran may no longer face ...Sunni Arab regimes determined to challenge it"..."emergence of a Shiite dominated democracy next door may well inspire a democratic revolution in Iran"..."may encourage Iran's defiance of the UN resolution".


FULL TEXT: Barring a last-minute hitch Iran and the United States are expected to begin talks on what they have both called "measures to benefit the Iraqi people." The euphemism is unlikely to deceive anyone. What Tehran and Washington are really interested in is to find out each other's true intentions in Iraq. There is no doubt that both Iran and the United States have benefited from the demise of the Baathist regime under Saddam Hussein. The US has eliminated an enemy that it had wounded but not killed in 1991, something that Machiavelli had warned against almost five centuries ago. With Iraq likely to have a pluralist regime in which Shiites are a majority, Iran may no longer face a coalition of Sunni Arab regimes determined to challenge it in the region. But while US and Iranian interests in Iraq converge up to a point, the two powers have diametrically opposite visions when it comes to the future of Iraq, indeed of the entire Middle East. The US wants a democratic and pro-West Iraq with a capitalist market-based economy, and open to the new globalization trends. In his better moments President George W. Bush has even spoken of turning Iraq into a model for the entire Arab world, indeed for all Muslim countries. And that, of course, is indirect competition with Iran that claims that its own system is the ideal one for all Muslims. Iran wants an Iraqi regime that adopts at least some aspects of Khomeinism if only to prove that the Islamic republic in Tehran is not a historic anomaly. The Tehran leadership is also concerned that the emergence of a Shiite-dominated democracy next door may well inspire a democratic revolution in Iran as well. With he center of Shiite theological authority clearly shifting to Najaf, Iran's rulers may risk losing the religious card they have played for the past 27 years. The crucial question in regional politics now is whether Iraq, and beyond it the Middle East, will be reshaped the way US wants it or remolded as Iran's Khomeinist leaders have dreamed of since 1979. It is against that background that it is important to know what Iran would actually bring to the table when, and if, the promised talks materialize. Iran has already scored a point simply by being invited by the US for talks.  Although Iran did nothing to oust Saddam Hussein, this invitation bestows on it a stature that only a liberating power would normally have. For example, at the end of World War II no one invited Switzerland or Poland, as neighbors of Germany, to discuss its future. Iran has scored yet another point by positioning itself as a power speaking for the Iraqi people. The leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic  Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Abdul-Aziz Hakim has helped Iran's maneuver by issuing a verbal "invitation" to enter the talks almost as a protector of the people of Iraq. The fact that Hakim and his party have been supported by Iran for more than a quarter of a century does not diminish the importance of that move. The Iranian strategy is clear from the outset. Foreign Minister Manuchehr  Mottaki has said that Iran's chief priority is to discuss the withdrawal of the US-led coalition forces from Iraq. Mottaki knows that the US and its allies are in Iraq under a United Nations' mandate that will run out in December. He also knows that that mandate cannot be renewed without the consent of the newly elected Iraqi Parliament and government. Finally, he also knows that President George W. Bush is under pressure from both Democrats and Republicans to bring the Iraqi episode to an end. So, when the Americans and their allies start to leave, as they are certain to do later this year, Iran would be able to pretend that it was its efforts that ended the "occupation". Iran, however, has more important ambitions in Iraq. Strategically, it sees post-Saddam Iraq as a corridor through which it can communicate with Syria and Lebanon that it considers as part of its broader glacis. In fact, once Tehran's influence is established in Iraq as it is in Syria and Lebanon, Iran would be able to project power in the Levant for the first time since the early 7th century when the Persian Empire under Khosrow Parviz drove the Byzantines out of Mesopotamia and what is now Syria. It is no accident that scholars in Tehran have just rediscovered the set of agreements that Iran had signed with the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.  Known as the Erzerum treaties, these documents give Iran a droit de regard (the right of oversight) over Iraq's principal Shiite centers of Najaf, Kerbala and Kazemayn (now a suburb of Baghdad). The agreements also enable Iran to take "appropriate action", a code word for military intervention, if it felt that its security, or the access of Iranian pilgrims to "holy places", was being threatened by the presence of foreign hostile forces in southern Iraq. If implemented those agreements could lead to the emergence of an Iranian administration in the "holy cities" and an Iranian veto on key aspects of Iraq's foreign policy. Iran has already used those agreements to persuade the new Iraqi government to sign an agreement under which more than 600,000 Iranian pilgrims would be able to visit Iraq each year with little control from the Iraqi authorities. The second set of documents that Tehran is now dusting up is known as the Algiers Accords, negotiated and signed in Algiers, Geneva, Tehran and Baghdad between 1975 and 1976. These give Iran and Iraq shared sovereignty over the Shatt Al-Arab estuary that constitutes Iraq's principal outlet to the open seas. The agreements, signed by Saddam Hussein as a tactical ploy to end Iranian support for the Kurds in the 1970s, would, if fully implemented, give Iran a chokehold on Iraq's foreign trade, including oil exports. Iran does not want the US to fail in Iraq. It wants the US to succeed in eliminating all possibility of a new Sunni-dominated regime being installed in Baghdad. But Iran wants the US to succeed at the highest possible cost, both in blood and treasure. It is a mystery why Washington wants to give Tehran a place at the high table in Iraq. It is certain that the Islamic republic will continue doing whatever it can to make life difficult for the US-led coalition. The supply of new and more lethal explosives, smuggled into Iraq from Iran, partly via Syria is unlikely to dry up. Nor is Tehran likely to end the training programs launched by its Lebanese Hezbollah clients for Iraqi militants. The decision to involve Iran in Iraqi affairs is likely to anger the United States regional allies who have never discounted the possibility of an Irano-American deal that might leave them in the lurch. The Arab states will also be concerned about the possibility of Iraq's Arab identity being diluted as a result of Iranian intervention. The US may have made this strange move because of the experiment in Afghanistan where talks with Iran did help speed up the defeat of the Taliban and the creation of a new regime in Kabul. But Iraq is not Afghanistan if only because it offers far more scope for Iranian mischief making. The invitation to Iraq is also likely to encourage Iran in its defiance of the United Nations on the nuclear issue. After all if Iran is treated as a major power in one domain it cannot be "bullied" as a weakling in another. Has the Bush administration made its first major mistake with regard to Iraq? It is too early to tell. But this decision may be even worse than a mistake; it may be unnecessary. And, as Talleyrand noted almost 200 years ago, in politics doing something that is not necessary is worse than making a mistake.