LONDON, UK, BAGHDAD, IRAQ- Recently discovered documents by the World Jewish News Agency in London revealed that leading British jurists and lawyers told the British government that the " U.S. and British bombing of Iraq in the months before the 2003 war was illegal under international law."
For the 10 years prior to the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States and Great Britain enforced the policy of no-fly zones over the north and south of Iraq. And a year before the war began, both, great Britain and the U.S. began to strike more frequently. The ordnance dropped on Iraq rose from 272 kilograms in April 2002 to nine tonnes in June and 50 tonnes in September, according to official British government figures. Leaked minutes of a July 23, 2002, meeting between Prime Minister Tony Blair and top government officials cite U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as saying: "The U.S. had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure on the regime." The Sunday Times newspaper said British Foreign Office lawyers cautioned in 2002 aircraft could only patrol the no-fly zones to deter attacks by Iraqi forces and were not authorized to put pressure on the Iraqi government. The United Nations had not yet passed Resolution 1441, which was used to justify military action, and the U.S. Congress did not authorize the use of force until October 2002. The newspaper quoted Lord Goodhart, vice-president of the International Commission of Jurists, as backing the Foreign Office lawyers' view. Goodhart said if "the purpose was to soften up Iraq for a future invasion or even to intimidate Iraq, the coalition forces were acting without lawful authority," the Sunday Times reported. The Sunday Times story was written by Michael Smith, who previously revealed a series of leaked British government memos from the months before the war. A senior British official who reviewed them said the content of those memos appeared authentic. The latest story said the legal advice was appended to a briefing paper for a July 2002 meeting on Iraq of top government officials. The leaked 2002 memos have reignited debate over the decision to go to war. They indicate Blair was committed to supporting U.S. President George W. Bush on Iraq but show British officials worried the White House was rushing to war on thin evidence and without sufficient planning. Source: CP, AP, WJNA
Toby Dodge: " Soon after 9/11 happened, the starting gun was fired for the invasion of Iraq,"
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Toby Dodge: "The documents show what official inquiries in Britain already
have, that the case of weapons of mass destruction was based on thin
intelligence and was used to inflate the evidence to the level of
mendacity,"
LONDON- When Prime Minister Tony Blair's chief foreign policy adviser dined with Condoleezza Rice six months after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, the then-U.S. national security adviser didn't want to discuss Osama bin Laden or al-Qaida. She wanted to talk about "regime change" in Iraq, setting the stage for the U.S.-led invasion more than a year later. President George W. Bush wanted Blair's support, but British officials worried the White House was rushing to war, according to a string of leaked secret Downing Street memos that have renewed questions and debate about Washington's motives for ousting Saddam Hussein. In one of the memos, British Foreign Office political director Peter Ricketts openly asks whether the Bush administration had a clear and compelling military reason for war. "U.S. scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and al-Qaida is so far frankly unconvincing," Ricketts says in the memo. "For Iraq, 'regime change' does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam." The documents appear to confirm Blair was genuinely concerned about Saddam's alleged weapons of mass destruction, but also indicate he was determined to go to war as America's top ally, even though his government thought a pre-emptive attack might be illegal under international law. "The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's WMD programs, but our tolerance of them post-11 September," said a typed copy of a March 22, 2002, memo obtained Thursday by The Associated Press and written to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. "But even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programs will not show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW (chemical or biological weapons) fronts: the programs are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know, been stepped up." Details from Rice's dinner conversation also are included in one of the secret memos from 2002, which disclose British concerns about both the invasion and poor postwar planning by the Bush administration, which critics say has allowed the Iraqi insurgency to rage. The eight memos - all labelled "secret" or "confidential" - were first obtained by British reporter Michael Smith, who has written about them in the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Times. Smith told The AP he protected the identity of the source he had obtained the documents from by typing copies of them on plain paper and destroying the originals. Investigating reporters obtained copies of six of the memos (the other two have circulated widely). A senior British official who reviewed the copies said their content appeared authentic. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the secret nature of the material. The eight documents total 36 pages and range from 10-page and eight-page studies on military and legal options in Iraq, to brief memorandums from British officials and the minutes of a private meeting held by Blair and his top advisers.
Toby Dodge, an Iraq expert who teaches at Queen Mary College, University of London, said the documents confirmed what post-invasion investigations have found. "The documents show what official inquiries in Britain already have, that the case of weapons of mass destruction was based on thin intelligence and was used to inflate the evidence to the level of mendacity," Dodge said. "In going to war with Bush, Blair defended the special relationship between the two countries, like other British leaders have. But he knew he was taking a huge political risk at home. He knew the war's legality was questionable and its unpopularity was never in doubt." Dodge said the memos also show Blair was aware of the postwar instability that was likely among Iraq's complex mix of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds once Saddam was defeated. The British documents confirm, as well, that "soon after 9/11 happened, the starting gun was fired for the invasion of Iraq," Dodge said. Speculation about if and when that would happen ran throughout 2002. On Jan. 29, Bush called Iraq, Iran and North Korea "an axis of evil." U.S. newspapers began reporting soon afterward that a U.S.-led war with Iraq was possible. On Oct. 16, the U.S. Congress voted to authorize Bush to go to war against Iraq. On Feb. 5, 2003, then-secretary of state Colin Powell presented the Bush administration's case about Iraq's weapons to the UN Security Council. On March 19-20, the U.S.-led invasion began. Bush and Blair both have been criticized at home since their WMD claims about Iraq proved false. But both have been re-elected, defending the conflict for removing a brutal dictator and promoting democracy in Iraq. Both administrations have dismissed the memos as old news. Details of the memos appeared in papers early last month but the news in Britain quickly turned to the election that returned Blair to power. In the United States, however, details of the memos' contents reignited a firestorm, especially among Democratic critics of Bush.